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INTRODUCTION

John Dune 600tu8 proposes In his philosophy two aots of
knowledge. the abstractive and the intuitive.

Intuitive knOw-

ledge is the knowledge of a thins present and existing, as 1t 1s

present and existing.

Abstraotive knowledge, on the other h.s.nd,

can be had of an object whether it 1s present or not and whether
it 1s existing or not.

Duns SootU8 proves the neoessity tor add1ng the aot of
intuit!",. knowledge to the act of abstractive knowledge on the
baaia of the adequaoy of

9i1ns

as the proper object of the in-

'allect attainable by intuitive knowledge ln an eminent degree,

since the proper object ot sense knowledge 1s attainable by Intultive knowledge.

This is the argument based on the analo81

w1 th senee knowledge.

Sootus proves his point also trom the

knowledge of our interior acta wblch must be iutu! tlYe, tro.tn In ....
tellective memorl which is a recall of the actually existl.ne;
thing. and from our knowledge of oontingent truths which predi-

cate aotual. existence of a. subject.

If we are to have the 1n-

tuitive knowledge that exists in the beatific vision, tbere muet
be a natural capacity 1n man pre-exist1ng th1s type of knowledg&
Tl1$ capaoity 1s natural, while the 81tt itself

and endowed by God.
1

18 aupernatural

The intuitive knowledge Qf a thing as aotually present
in its concrete existence postulates the individual being as the
proper object of the intellect.

The concept ot being is the pro-

duct of both abstractive and intuitive knowledge, and i . univocal
and adequate as to motivation and predicat10n.
belng as object of the

lntell~ot

The indlvidual

is made up of the tortn$11ties of

the common nature and 1ndividuality or haeecelty, termally dlstinct, but in reality identioal.

The tormal distinction between

the individua11ty and the common nature produoes the individual
being and serves as the foundation tor intuitive knowledge.
Wi th the sensl ti ve power or taoul ty of the soul tormally distinct, but really ident1oal. with theintellect1ve tao,""
ulty or power•• allowlng to the 8gtp ot these powers a real dlst1notion--the s1m1lar1ty between sense knowledge and intelleotual
knowledge as be1ng intu1t1ve takes the torm of an identity, properly d1stingUishing intelleotual 1ntuit1ve knowledge to exist in

an eminent degree over sensitive 1ntuitive knowledge.
Endeavor. will be made to present the dootrine of John
Duns Sootus on intuitive knowledge.

The doctrine on univocal

being and the formal distinction w111 be presented to Sl"$ a
better undersftand1ng

01'

1ntui t1 ve knowledge.

Adequa~e

Judgment

on the doctr1ne ot John Duns Sootus concern1ng 1ntUi 1',ive knowledge can be g1ven, if his doctrlne 1s oons1dered as a log1oal.
development trom his own pr1noiples of philosophy, namely, the
unlvooity of being and the formal d1st1notlon.

~------------------------------------,

CHAPTER I

INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE IN THF PHILOSOPrrr OF JOHN DUNS aCOTUS

The philosoph1cal doctrine of a man ie passed on \0 pos.
terity through his writings.
dition.

$

souroe more certain tha.n oral tra-

However. eVen into the writlngs ot a man may oreep works

that are not his, because 01' the over-zealousness of hls tollowers to glve to their master proper credit, or because of inadvertenoe and 19no;c'Qnce.

The.t'e a.re at p.r$aent two ohief sources for

the works of John Dune Sootuel the Wadding edition and the Vives
edition.

These editions inolude the spurious with tbe authentio

works of Sootus.

The 600tist10 oomm1aalon. however, d1reoted at

present by Charlel Ball?, O.F.M., 1s now worklns at Rome meticulously and labor1ously on

an."

cr1tioal edit10n that purports to

lnolude the authentio works of' $Ootu8, 'lbe best orit1ce.l re&Ungs
of thoae works, ...... two volumes of which a.re publlehed ....-and 'What.
promises to be an unbiased and taotual 11te of Scotua, being

wr1 "t.en by Ephrell Longpr*', o. F1' 1"1., the tonner dlrec tor
misslon.

0f

the OOIJloi

This purifioation after a century and .. halt' of obli-

vion t.ends to eliminate the oontradiotions in the 'WOl?ks Of SeotUG, and heralds a new !lowering of philosophy, in the place of
lts dCtcadenoe.

4

The results of the critioism to whioh the work ot Duns
sootus has been subJeoted hal thrown a new light on hi.
philosophy. Contrad1ctions disappear, the l1nks with the
past are stronger, the constructive value is more evident,
and we now see the genius of the FranCiscan master in a v_r.r
different light trom that in which 1 t was formerly place4.l.IntUition 1s a vague and ethereal term, misunderstood
very muoh, when it is understood at all.
M.DeMunnynolt,

O.P.~

in his excellent study on intui·

tion" bas passed on to us a rather complete division of the kinde

ot intuition that exist.
intuition" where

Most oommon of all is the

~pe~cept1v.

~sen.lble

objects impose themselves on our peroeption without any 1ntermediary.tt 2 The peroeptive intuition
dominates our whOle imaginatIve lite.

The "1magin&tlve intui-

tion" reveals, as it 1n a dream, a wholly imaginative world by

means of an internal vieion.' On the next step up is the "lntrarational intuition", 1n whioh "everyone at some time or another

gets a new Idea, & new image, whlch is not the fruIt ot reasonlns
something wh1c11 is offered brusquely to the attention of 'lihe

mInd."4 The Intuition of genius, of inventiveness, of Indivl~
dualIty is the infra-rational intUitIon.

nFundamen~

1ntelleo-

tual intuition" 1s the 1mmediate grasp ot the object common to
....

1

l-!aurice

DeWU.1t,

Hls.\gU

aJ:

HlA!,Yti9,l~S9R91:,
•

trans. Ernest C. Messenger, Londin. 19'7, II.

2 M. De14~ok. 0.1'., "Notes on Intu1tIon," %hi.

%b2mi,~, It

19'9, 146.

, n1A., 148.
4 .Ib14., 151.

the mind, 11'h& intuitlon--to what degree ot clarlty it rnal be--ot
be1ng as suoh.

"To the unique na.ture of the intelligence there

should oorrespond a common object.

All that we oonCelve must

present a common aspect rendering 1t intelligible.
aspect, we soon discover, 1s

all 1ts fullness.uS

nothir~

other than

This common

~!1n6,

taken 1n

The "post-rational intu1tion" 1s the pro....

gressive vlsion on conolusions the mind dev,elops in 1ts t.hlnk-

1ng.6 ·Supra-rat1om),1 1ntul tion" 1s a vis10ning of thinss -abo".
reason,

tor example, the harmonious reasonableness exlst.lng

8.111

between the infinite meroy and the inf1n1te Justice of God. 7

The "lllY8tr1oal 1ntu1 tlon" of the salnts 113 the pure vision of
God.

a
IntUition, as its a1snlf1oance appears 1n the pages ot

the philosophy of Duns Scotue 1s a \ype of 'libe intellectual intuition.

5ooti81110 intuition is the act of understanding an Ob-

Ject both as ao'liualll preeent and actually existing.

This act ot

lntui tlon is distinct from tbe act of Ui"1derstanding. called. ab-

straotion, which is indifferent to the $xistenoe or non-existence

ot the object, as well as to 1ta presenoe or absenoe.

Why

ahoul4

there be possible suoh an aoto! intuitive knowledge 1n addition

154.

5

~b1d.

6

~.,

7

~.,

e

lb.14. , 164. 165.

,

156. 157.
159-161.

I""

6
t.o abstraotlve

knowledge' Duns Scotus gives the followinganewer

as proof for intuitive kno'Wledse.

Every absolute cosnitional pel'

t.ation that inheres in the sensitive faculty of knowledge should
eminently inhere 1n the intelleotual faoulty of knowledge.

)fow

lt 1s proper t.o the perfeotion of aotual knowledge to gralp COil.
pl. tell 1t.f1rst known obJeo:t.

The obJeot is not oompletel,

grasped, when it 1s not grasped in 1tselt. but in a cer1iain 41JD1nlshe4 llkeness derived trom 1t.

The .ena1tiVe faoulty pos....

eesses this perteotion in 1ts knowledge, because lt can gra.p th.
object 1n ltself,. as 1t 1s actually existing and aotually pre.ent.

The sensitive faoulty does not grasp t.he obJeot 1n a dl-

m1nished resemblance and ln a oertain dimlnished perteotlon.

therefore, th1s kind of knowledge should 1nhere ln the intelleotlv. tao ultl. and oannot lnhere there, unless that tacultl know
lts object as actually ex1stlng and .s aotually present,

O~ in

some 1ntelligible obJeot em1nently oonta1n1ng thls flrst known
obJeot.9
9 Joanne. Duns Seottle, Qw+es~'2nll !i\Y9sYt'btta.~.,
q. VI, n. ~t . puns SPO~i ~ Qma.I, ed. V1ves, par a, I I.1895,

xxv. 243, 244: late aotuj-llitelllsend1 • • • potelt sat1a proprie
4101 abstractlvus, qula abatrahlt obJeotum ab ex1attentla et non
exletentia, praesenti. et ab.entia. Allus autem actus in\.lllsendl, quem tamen non 1t. oertltudlna.llt.r exper1mur in nobie.
pOssibllie \amen eat talls, qui .0.1110e' praeoiae a1 t obJect1
praesentl. ut praes entls, et exIstent is ut existentis. Hoo probatur, qula omnie perfeetio cogn1tlonls abaolute, quae poteet
Oompellere potentla. 00gn1t1ve. senslft!".., poteet em1nen1ier oompet ere potentla. cogn1t1"•• 1ntellectlvae, nuno aut.a pertec'tionls est in actu cognoscendl. ut cognlt10 eat, perteet. attlngere

7
While Duns 5cotus modifies the theory that says our
knOwledge ls the result, of abstraction alone, he admits that the

theory of intuitive knowledge lupplemente the theory ot abstraoIn abstract1v,. knowledge the intelleot abatraots the ob-

tion.

jeot from existence and non-existenoe. from 1ts presence and absenoe.

'there i8 another k1nd of knowledge, however, whlcb focu-

seS precisely upon a present objeot as present. and on an existinS object as existing. The evidenoe tor this addit10nal kind ot
knOwledse flowa from an analogy with sense knowledge.

Any cogni.

tlve perfeotion that belongs to aenae knowledge should belons 1n

an eminent degree to intelleotual knowledse.

We know perteC1i17,

when . . know the obJeot in itself, not when we know the obJeot
~nl1

in aome diminished sim1larity or in some limilarlty derived

from the obJeot.

lense knowledge ia pertect knowledge, beoaus.

lenee atta1ns its object

a8

1t is 1n 1tsel!,

present in 1ta real ex1stenee.
should also portain

a8

ex1sting, and aa

Perfeot knowledge of this kind

to the intellectual tacnlltJ. since the sensl-

pr1mwn cogn1tt;ll' non a.utem perteote attingltur, quando non in .e
• tt1 ns1 t.tU", sed tantummodo 1n allqua diminuta, vel 4er1vat,a simi11tud1ne ab Ipso J sens1 tl va. autem ta bet hane perteot1on.em in OOS""
~1tlone SUA. quia potelt obJectum att1ngere 1n se, ut existens,
et ut,pre.esena est in ex1stentis. reali, at non tantum diminut.
-.ttlngendo lpaum in quadam perfeotion. d1m1nuta, ergo lsta perteot10 eompet1t intellect!vae in oognoscendo, se4 non poss.t alb1
competere, nisi cognosoeret existens, 8t ut in existent1a propria
praesens est, vel in allque obJeoto lnte11ig1b1l1 em1nenter lpsum
l~y~t1nen.te • •• Se. also ~ 2Mmsmll. IV, 4. 49. q. 12, XXI,
.,...a, .Q.2.t!i gxonltQ,!. II, d. ',' q. 9. XII, 212, 213.

~---------------------------------,
8

\lye power,'" conJ01ned to an Intelleotual soul and an organ, as

tor example, vls10n. 1s really identIcal with the soul, slne. the
.ensitive power Is cons 14ere4 as a vlrtue of the soul Ita.l!,
which do•• not need operation unless united to the organ,lO and
also because of the adequacy ot unlvocal being as the object ot

ih. Intelleot.
be sa1d

Of un1Yocity and the formal distinction

1n later ohapt.ers.

~re

wlll

Therefore, the intelleot oan know.

thlng as ex1sting and aa 1t 1s present In It. own exIstence.
ThIs knowledge mal be called intu1tlve knowledge, 1n the .trlct
sense of the term; 81noe 1t 1s an intuItion of the thing ••

aot.ualll pr••ent and exlstlng.ll

,

Ephrem Longpre calls the basis of t,h8 concept of un1"",

vocal 'being that 1s the adequate object of the 1nt,elleO\ and tbe
product of th.intelleot·. proces8 of abetrut1ve and Intuitive
knowledge the individual Ens.

The indlY1dual being is an obJeot

ot thought, and 1 t 1s ,be Only real1 tl whlch exists in taot.

1'be

individual beIng 18 constituted of the quiddIties or formalities
of individuality and the common nature, both of whioh

mally d1st1not. tbat 1s to aal. really identical.

fir.

tor-

A more com-

". . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,
.

plete explanaftion of the formal distinction will follow in aM.p'er III.

In order to reaoh the quidd1ties of indiViduality, fthe

concrete and aotual existenoe of the individual belng, and of the
oommon nature, the ideal qu1ddity, abstractlve and intuitive kno

ledge must be employed.

Abstractlve knowledge reaohes

~h.

object

1n its ldeal q\114411;" or in 1.ts common nature, through the InIntuit1ve know-

tell1e;lble Ipee1•• Wh10h moves the 1ntellect.

I.CIs. reaohes the ObJect in 1t. existent1al reality,

01'

1n 11;s

individuality. through the thing present 10 itself whioh dlrectly
DlOves the 1ntellect 4

Intul tl ve knowledge grasp. in,medlately the

thing ltself present 1n it. conorete existence, and 1t also

grasps the real and objeotlve aspeots of the EnS, the first
tentlons of be1ns. or the nature as natut'e.

1~

By this dual know....

ledge the mlnd has a complete and a d1rect grasp of the Individual.
AS an object of thought, the individual EnS 1. also the on11
reality which exlsts 1n fact. In order to reach 1ts eonorete and aotual eXistence, and to give us an 1deal repre•
• entatlon. aocordlng to nuns acotul, two way. present them.elvesl the abstractlve and the intUitlve cognitlon, The
forJ1ier 1s based on abstraction, 1t do •• not reach lta obJect
ln ltaex1st-ential realIty. bu\ in its ideal quiddity; thie
ls the foundatlon of 801enoe 1n the Aristotelian .enee ot
tbe word, thanks to the abstraot concepts which 1 t elaborate.. Intuit1ve cognition, on the contrary, ls a direot"
vlew of the obJect. 1t touches immedlately the thlng ltael!
1n its conere'. exlstence, a.s well as the real and obJectlve aspects of the Ene, whioh the S.Cholastl0. call ~
llrlm~ ent1s • In abstractive cogn1t.lol1, the I'ii'tiI....
Igl~e speces moves the 1nt.elleot, ln the lntu1tive cognItion, on t.he oont.ra!'1. lt 1s the obJect, .til. P£af I IUll1D

fliPs.

B.

It 11 1n th1s double fash10n that. the

~1nd

d1rectly

~-~------------------------I
10
grasplif the indIvidual •• " • 12
The 600ti8t10 o.oncept of the individual being, made up

of the common nature and the individual difterenoe or baecoe1ty,
differs vastly from the Aristotelian-Thomistio composite, oonstit.uted ot prime matter and substantia.l form, whioh are really cUetinct.

Abstraotlve knowledge

common nature.

~eaches

as tar a.s the essence or

IntU1 tlve knowledge complete. the process by

reaoh1ng the flrst intentions 01' being, the existential presenoe
e.h1ning through the 1nM.vidual1 t1.

In abstraotion the inttelll-

g1ble speCies motivates the intellect, but the thing present in
itself 1s the motivating obJeot in IntuitIve knowledge.
To safeguard our oertitude about the existenoe of obJects outs1de the mind Scotul postulate. intuItive knowledge in
addition to abstraotive knowledge.

The abstracted species pre-

.ents to the mind the quiddIty.of the object devoid of It. aotual

oonditions, telling us nothing of 1ts actual exlet.ence, sinoe it
preac1nds from the obJect's existenoe or nen-ex1stenoe.

Abs~e.

tion is an imperfect kInd of knowledge, since the obJeot 1s not
present in ltself, but 1s present through the intermediary ot a
speOies that represents the object imperfectly.

The intellect

should ha.ve the prIvIlege of' a more perfeot type of knowledge, as

..

11
,iven ln 1ntuit1ve knowledge, sinoe the sense faculty. inferior

1D 1t8 cognltion to the intelleotual fa.culty. reaches lt8 object.
pertectly 1n ita actual presence .and ooncrete existence.

B'1 this

intuitive knowledge the lntellect has the impresslon of 11t.,
tbAt le, of things as they are existing and in the concrete.

"Intu1tive cogn1tlon is ln ltself a more perfect manner of
knowlng than abstractlve cogn1t10ns in 1ntu1t10n, the obJeot
ls g1ven as present 1n ltself and not by the lntermedlar.y of
a speoles which represents lt imperfeotlYJ wl4er thie head!
it ls fittlng to endow reason wlth the priv11ege ot lntu1tlon, and thls, so muoh the more because .ense. whioh 1s an
lnferlor oognitive faoulty. enjoys it and reaohes ooncretely
lts obJeot. Without 1ntuitlon, the intellect would never
have the impression 01' lite, of the ex1stlng and 01' the concrete, for the abstraot, speoies represents preo1Mly the
quiddity ot the obJeot outSide of all its aotual oonditions,
and tMch•• us noth1ng about lts existenoe." "In etfeot,"
800tus contln~~I, "abstractlve oogn1tlon represtmts equally,
in an ideal matmer, a th1ng that, exlsts or that do •• not ex1st, an. obJect present or not; accordingly, it 1. impossible
to obtain by thl$ means. oognit1on ot a t.hing as far aa 1t
1s exist1ng and present to t,he subjeot whioh peroeive. 1t.
It 1s necessary, then, that the lntelleot be endowed w1th 1n
tuition, otherwise it would not have e:rq oertltude of the ex
lstenoe of any obJeot whatsoevert
ln3tl,leftf! !lQ1l
ISI.t Hr~y! M !flg!!!. Ha.st~tn;;fl ______ 212Jeoll. It ..

itim

Following the argument 1n tavor ot intu1tive knowledge
trom the analo8Y Wlth Sense knowledge,

5001;u8

ment from the knowledge of our lnter10r acts.

proposes the argu800tU8

says that

lt we would not have an 1ntuit1ve knowledge ot 80me objeot, we

would not know whether our aots are wlthin us or not with any degree of cert1tude.

It 18 a taot. however, that we do know 'that.

our 1ntrinsio aots of intelleotlon and wil11ng, along with our

-

12
,ense knOwledge belong to our Ego.

I need, I desire; I see, I feel.

I ponder. I wonder, I want.,
EXper1enoe teaches tMs.

Jlot a questlon of "it 1s thought. it 1s seen".

It 1.

Therefore, the

same reasons tbat hold good tor plaoing the indiv1dual beins .a
the object 01' 1ntu1tive knowledge, hold 8004 tor any being what-

including our interior act~.14
Intuitive knowle4se 1s the knowledge ot • conc.r-etel,
present object, insotar

.a 1t 1s actually existins.

apprebends itself oonoretely with no intermediary.
also

~.

nee..

The

soul.

In th1s way

soul apprehends its acts and its states ot oonsoious-

This i8 an intu1tion we experienoe of our inner aote.

our

interior acts are present to ouraelves and existing within us,
and our knowledge of them 1s a knowledge ot them as present and
exletlng.

This is intuitive knowledge ot our intrinsic aotl, the

revelation ot our consoious act., revealing i tselt w1 th the JJueoes.lve states 01' our thoughts and volltions.
cholog1cal lntui tlon of the Ego.

This 1s the psy-

Longpre tells us that

psychologlcal lntultion 1s an immediate perception, t.he act
ot an interior .ense by which the soul apprehends 1tself
w1thout any intermediate agent, as well as 1ts operations
and lts states of COnso1enoe: ~dy !,ASH, !A .t!i. J2!ro!Pt~2D! inter1or! IXptr1myt. In t '8 apperoept1on thi soUl

t

14 Scotus, ~Q!2nlinsl. IV, 4.49, q. 8, XXI,
306s ••• 51 non haberemu8 4e arIque cognlt!onem lntultlVAm, non
~!~remus de aot1bus nostri, 81 lnsunt nobls, vel non cert1tu414~lter (de aotibu8 dlco lnt»1naeC1s), sed hoo est ialauro, ergo,
eto. ergo eadem ratione qua pon1e unum ena posse 1ntuitive oognosol, et quodo,umque.

l~l------------------------~I
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...
apprehends itself concretely. AS an experienced intu1tion.
808 consclence, or 11ght of our Consoious acts; 1t renews 1'toself in proportion as our thoughts and our acts ot will succeed each other. 1t reveals the existence of' the Ego, 1ta
ontologioal tendenc1e8, and its lxnmanent operatlonstbut nothlng beyond their presence and the assurance that 'tohey 'belong to the subject which experienoes them • • ••
The
supernatural esoape. the grasp of' psyohological experlenoe.
Likewise. intuition dOes not sive us the knowledge of the
nature or even ot the essenoe ot the soul.IS
Longpre goes on to explain that when We wlsh to fix the

proper obJeot ot a faoulty, we prooeed "trom the very nature 1t...
aelf' of the immanent act peroelv.A by internal experienoe, an4

not preoisely from the essenoe ot th1s faculty, oonsidered a.bstraotly_ "16 Proceed1ng f'rom the essence ot the intellect. considered abstraotly, we should say that, s1nce the human oomposite
is cOluJi;1tut.ed of a form in matter, the soul sUbatant,iaIly unlted
to the 'body. human knowledge should prooeed along the lines ot
abstraoting the torm from matter) b$cause there ls a proportion
in the modes of existenoe betWeen the obJeot of knowledge and the

faoul t1 of knowledge.
oond chapter,

Thie thought will be expanded in the s ....

Proceed1ns. however, wlth DUns scotue from t;he

very nature 1tself of the intrinsic act aa percelved by internal

-

..
I

15 IQnspre. "The PS10h010~ of Duns Sootua and its
Modernlty,~ 26, 27. saotus, QRHl QXt~lnS., IV, d.
q. 2,
n. 2, xx.
.

4,.

16 lliJ&., 29. scotus, QXtllitfl1 l19.§S9tt1GRlb Ch 1,
n,l), VIII, a'fExOepto aotu quem exp.r~mur, conclud1mua potent1tl.m et naturamt ouJus iste actus est, 111Ud resploere pro ODJeoto qUOd perclplmas attingi per aotum, ita quod obJectum poten...
tia. non conclu41tur ex oognit1on. potentia. led ex oognition.

L
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experience; seen in our introspections, we see several things
~b&t

lead us to estab11sh the proper object ot the 1ntellect.

,rom the very nature ot the internal act as perceived by psyoho-

logical intuition, we experience the incapa.oity otthe 1n't,elle.,\

w

embrace at the aame time actually and concretely &n 1nf1n1te

nWilber ot objects, and that tbe intelleot Wlderstands quit. indist1nctl, .. larse number of objects, taken aotualll and coneretell ate the same t1me, it these obJeot. are understood throUSb

a variety ot spe01es. 11 SeoondlJ, psycholog1cal 1ntuition show.
us 't,he 1mperfeot1on and tbe l1m1 te ot hwnan knowledse. 18 F1naUa
introspection teaohes us that our lntellectual aots succeed on.
atkr the other. having an exis 'enee after a non-&.Xistence. and

are not perpetual. 19 SinOe the intellect 18 imperfeot, l1m1ted,

.

and incapable 01.' grasping a tnul t1 tude of objects at the. lAme

but proceeds fro.m one intelleotual
t

1

_

.

time,

aot to another, it follows

....

actue quem experlmur,

'56.
t ua11ter

17 ~.
q. ,. n. 5, XXlll

feporta!l flf!&t!n!ll. III, d. 14,
quO nel ectus noa\e,r non ..
extend1t 11mul &0
in int1n1ta nec ex~ender. poteat 1mo
valde indistinct. intelllS!t plura s1mul actu sl 111a 1o'.!11gentur per diver.as species.
SOQtU8,

Exper mUl'

18 lW. Scotu8, Q.lImi i{Qniens l • lIt d. " q. 9L n. 2,
XII. 216, Opus Oxoniense, Ill, 4.
• q.2, n. 20, XIV, ,1"(.
19 l.b.1d. 8OOtu6, QllW! Qlgp.lep!l. I, 4. ,. q. 7, n. 30,
IX, 361 •••• -rniellect10 actuiI1s est ailqUld 1n nobis non perpetuum "4 b.a.bens esse post non esse 810ut experlm.ur.

~----------------------------------------,
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there must be one proper object ot the intellect, the individual
being.

Duns scotus believes that every singular is ot itselt
intelligible, even though the singular may not be as equally intelligible to every intellect.

Sinoe the understanding is the

fa.culty that naturally grasps ,the entire being in its essence and
and in its ex1stence, and since in the singular there i8 nothing
that stands outSide of being, everything within the s1ngular
1s intelligible by its very na.ture.

be1~

Sinoe tbe individual in 1t...

selt possesses w11ty, the individual being is intelligible in Iteelt and directly.

SCOtu8 says

fttha1i every Singular, to whatever genus it belongs, 1s ot it,.
self intelligible, although it way not be equally so to
ever-s int-elleot. consequently, sinoe the understanding i8
the ta.culty of the entire Ene, and Since in the singular
there 18 nothing whioh is not posit1vely EnS, all tha.t 18 1n
the singular Ens 1s intell1gible by 1te very nature. Moreover, the indiv1dual 1n itaelf is endowed w1th un1t1= 1t 1s
then intellig1ble by ltself and d1rectly.~20

It we d1d not know direotly our interior acts, both the
intellectual and ot the 1nter1or senses and sensation, we would
have no proof tor the eXistence of our 1ndividual soul from the
permanency ot the Ego through our successlve and var1ed acts.
Th1s would lead to the lmpermanent, ever-flitting "states of oonso1ousnese~,

as the substrate of personal1ty, instead of the Ego

or the soul.

The ground tor the direct lu)owledge ot the selt as

....
20 lb'~.' 40. Sootus, BIPPrtat! larisl!nela, III,
d. 14, q. 3. n. • XXII, 357.

r
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ih1nk1ng wdUld wash away.
w1th knowledge and soienoe.

Introspection would disappear, along
The internal evidence tor the d1reot

)tnowledge of our interior aots denied, ...·how else oan we know
tnem?--common sense is denled f since one denies onets self.

The

result oould lead anywhere. to a state of doubt at the least.
we now come to the third of the quintet of proofs Dune

sootus of tel's in favor of intuitive knowledge.
One ot our 1nter1or aota is the power ot rememberlng
things, on t.he sens1ble level, as on the level ot 1nt.ellectlon.
Th$re 1e .1n the 1ntelleot the power ot recollect10n 1n rela.tion

to a universal obJeot, and even in relation to a Singular object.
in add1tion to ac"ts of the w111.

Were it othel'w1se, we would

bave to deny the sanctIons ot pWllsbment and reward, tor we reoall the indivIdual deeds that deserve reward and teel happy, or
that deserve punishment and teel guilty,

In this wa,y reoollec-

tion is proper to the intelleot, but there is a oertain kind of
recollection common to the intelleotive and sensitive faoulty in

man.

There 1. the recollectlon on the part of the interior sen-

sitive powers.

Just as the intellect can perceive my act intui-

tIvely or abstraotively, In the aot of understanding, so the
sense can record whether 1t 'be an aot proper to the intellect,
or proper to some otber facul·ty.21

-

21 Scotus, BfPOttaif far1S~lne1A' IV, d. 45, q. "
n. la, ;(XIV, 514: ... ,. reoor r non est partie seUl.s1tiva., sed

I

I

r-
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I~tuitlve

knowledge is not only ot the singular, but

••sent1ally lt is at the ex1sting nature itself, as existing.
Intellective memory is also of a past obJeot previously eXisting,
not as singular, but as this singular, as existing, which is not
out ott from the universal, although it may be out otf from the
abstractive quiddity througb the operation ot tlle intelleot,

A

rose ex1st,lng at t,be present is not out otf from the universal
conoept, upon whioh sclence ls tounded, even though the universal
baS not reaohed 1ts ultimate grade ot abstraotlon. 22

-lntelleotivae.

Reoordatio 8n1m non tantum est 1n 1nte1leotu re.pectu obJeotl un1versalis, imo respectu obJeoti s1ngular1s, et
aotus voland! s1mili tel', alias oportet negare poenas e\ praem1a.
• • • Unde 4100 quod 1sta r8cor4&tl0 est proprla lntelleotua,
quae non est al terius, sed tantwn est reoordatl0 a.otu.s 1ps1us intelleotus et voluntat1s. Sed alla est. s1militer reeordatl0, quae
e.t commun1s sib! at allis, s0111cet part! intellect1vae et senalilv..., nam quaedanl est reoord&t10 potent1arum lnter1orum, scl110et sensitlvarum: slout enlm 1ntelleotus poteet peroipere actum
meum intuitive vel abstra.otive, intelllgendo, 1ta posset sensus
recordarl, s1ve sit aotus proprius lntelleotus, sive allarum
potent1a.rum.

22 ~., n. 1', XXIV, 575, 576= cognitio lntultlva
non est tantum s1ngularis, 1nQuantum est 008Oltl0 lntu1tiva, sed
essen't,1al1ter est ipelus naturae existentls , ut ex1etens est,
quia pr1us competlt esse naturae, quam slt ut haec sive ut s1ngulare, eo quod assentia s1 t eJuedeln ratlon1s 1n omnibus sln,su...
lar1bus, non autem slngularitas ipsa est ejusdem ration1s in
omn1bus, fed. d1verse. ln quollbet singula.r! unlue essentlaeJ ex
quO sequitur quod essent!a poteet cOSnQec1, non tamen slngular1tas eJus. cum 19itur ad recordatlonem non requirltur nie1 preeterltwn pr1us exist.ne. 1108t non ut 81ngulare, ldolroo esto quod
singulare, ut tale, non lntelllg1tur a.b 1ntellectu, lntell1g1tur
tamen allquld slngular., non ut slngulare, sed ut lntellls1tur,
.t tale e1..'1e;ulare, ut eXletene. non reoedit ab universa.11, 110et
a qUldd1ta~ abstractlva per lntellectum recedat, qula rosa nunc
ex1stene non reced1t a rosa. universa11, de qua solentla est, 11.
Cet non slt universale 1n ultimo sradu abstraotlon1e; et 1ta dloo

ri-

,
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1h1s 1s the third of the quintet of proofs ScotU8 pro-

poses tor lntu1t1ve knowledge.
are acquainted with.
~r1.

Intelleot1ve memory is an act we

We recall 1deas; a speecb is given from

The tactual internal eV1denoe tor this aot of memory

postulates a faoulty of memory, 8inee 9P,mUSl !t9U;ttyr dU., an
act b.tokena a faculty, Just as every effect must have a cause.

at oou.rse, the 1ntelleotive memory draws

1ta material. trom the

,torehousfI ot 1ma.se. retained 1n the phantasy.

ot ,ensibla image', of phantasms.

There 1s a recall

We recall an image of a fUl ...

crum, of a triangle, of the written or spoken word.

Upon this r.

call of senSible 1lliages 1s baaed the intellective recall ot idea&
However, to reoall an 1otel11g1ble species as essence oompletely

separated trom 1ts aotual existence and indlv1dual oharaoter, 1s
to recall the empt1 shell of reality, a shadow and a fiction ot
what 1s really present in actually existing lndividual thIngs.
As

~,result

we are

contr~nted

with the chasm sp11tting our in-

tellectIve remembranoe of ind1vidual reallty from the material
phantasm, and,

80

to speak, lts sensitive memory, the basis tor

intelleotive memory.

Thls severs memory from Its object.

AS

a

consequence, we can see a great deal ot wealth and an 1mmense
qUOd anima eeparata reoordari poteet,d.e tall natura exletente~
110et non ut 81~UlarlS. See also Parthenlus Minges, Joann1f
l1I Ul1! ~.
'.. 1B9t~P! lhib9loPh!91 !! t heoJ,ogla, Florentlae, 930,
, 93;"'203.

19
depth of thC'>ught in Plato's attempt to bind the intellect; to
reality through the reoolleotion of "I4eas".

To recall the ob-

Jeo tive "forms" Plato lntimates the mind'. need for an objective
basis for the universal ooncept it forms. a,

There should be a

lW,1verSAAft in 0, a common nature, which in its turn, conjoined

to the spec1fio nature, serves, as a basis for ideation and recall•
.A

memory about the past. and an opinion about the

tuture are the two kinds of imperfeot 1ntuitive knowledge scotus
proffers; while 1ntu1 t1ve knowledge about the ne:ture. or 'the singular, as 1t partakes of aotual existence, 1s perfect intu1 t1 ve .
knowledge. a4
passing over imperfect intu1 tl ve knowledge as an opinlon about the future, We see that the proof tor intuit1ve knowledge from intelleot1ve memory rest. upon the proof from our
knowledge ot contingent truth..

This proof introduces the fourth

member of the qUintet.
lootus tells us that the human intellect can know the
slngular a8 this slngular, because th1s knowledge 1s not dispro-

port1onate; nor 18 thl. knowledge contrad1ctory to the created

n~:l~:

Plato., f~~' e4. John Burn.et., Oxford, 1925. 728.E.2,Taylor,
l_~_," :u H!n J!:M ll1l.!t2rl. New York, 1936,
24

scotua, Qa!. Qxona.tnSsh III, d. 14, q. 2, XIV, 527.

in,.llect, •• intellect.

The human intellect, however, cannot

kDO w the singular, as this singular, from the nature of the un! ...
••rs a1 , since this nature, as suoh, ls not contained determinate11, that 1s, as thls nature, within the notion of universality_
consequently J it the Singular 1$
knOwn

~own

through a species proper to 1t.

as th1s • insular , 1t 1s
It is improbable that

every speeles of all poslible singulars should be created at the
.-me tlme that the human intellect knows them.
~1e.

The •• posslbl1i-

being infinite in number, there would be an infinite number

of actual infinite speoies, and the indiv1dual could know everything. 25

lut should the human intellect bave a not1on of the
.ingular, as 1t 1s s1ngular, that 1s not taken from things, stl11
1t would be necesaarr to grasp the notion of the aotual existence
of the thing, or 1tl non-existence. and also a notion of the aoeldents requ1red for the existence or non-existence of the th1ns.
from reality.

Th. reason tor thIs 1s ev1dent, s1nce from the

not1on of quiddit1es and un1versa18, which are olearly necessary
in nature, there can be no knowledge of the contingent proposition.

Tbe existence or non-eXistence of things, however, are con-

tingent tao'-.

Consequently, 1t 1s not adequate

II, 278. 25 Scotus, Q:W!!. Qxqnlens"

\0

have the

II, d. 3,q. 11, n. 11,

do'1o n of quiddit1es or un1versals, in order to knOw that th1s
.insular ex1sts, say, tor example, "SOorates here 18 runn1ns" t
~U, It.ls a neOGssity that th1s not1on be taken trom th1ngs.26

scotus confirms th1s oonolus1on.

Should the natures.ot

tbe terms ot the oont1ngent proposl tlon be oreated 81mul taneously

,,1 th human knowledge, they

wo~d

have .. determinate or an lnde-

terminate significat10n tor the natures 01' the two terms ot this
oont1ngent propos 1 tlon, tor example, that I tat down yesterdal.

It the significatlon be determlnate, there 'WOuld follow no posalbl1!ty ot knowing that the propOSition 1s oontingent trom the
terms themselve..

It the s1gnification is indeterminate, one

OQuld never arrive at the determinate taot that I am Sitting from
those terma.

From tbis reasoning follows the neoe.81ty for

taking from some other eource the certain knowledge 01' the cont1ngent propos1tion.21
The ':ruth. that can be known by the intult1ve knowledg.:
01' existing th1~J as they are exlsting, that ls, contingent

vuths, cannot be known through the med1um of any specles whatever.

The explanatlon rests in the taot that from the knowledge

of the term. there can be no knowledge of the interlinking and
existential truth oonoerning the two terms of oontingent oom-

11211\., 278, 279.
27 .ill4. t 219.
26

rr

,

plexes; that 1s to 8&1. of proposItIons Joined
1etence, the oopula. "1t Is", or "est".

b~

the nexus of ex

The existential" truth of

contingent propositions 1s not Inoluded wlthin the terms, .a the
neeessary existential truth of the soientifio proposItion is included in the speoies and in the terms.

From this tallows the

necessity for having some things present 1n themselves, in order
that they may be known and aeen in themselves intuit1vely, to account tor the knowledge of contIngent truthS, whioh deal with exlsting things, a. they are aotually exIsting.

ThIs prooesa of

knOwing contingent truths cannot be aooomplished in the common

senUl. unless by means ot things themselves present 1n themselve'
acoording to their own eXistence, nor on this aocount, can actual
or natl1tual 1ntuIt.lve knowledge 1n the common genus 'be given the
soul (ot Qbristta humanity) about all things.

He makes progres.

in knowledge like every other floul by knowing one thins after
other. 1n Qne way or anotber.

~he

In relation to imperfect intuit1ve

knowle4ge, whioh remain., oarried about by the intellective

me~

ory as. habitual intuitive knowledge, as the lett-over trom our
perfect intuitive cognitIons, the same may be said that it does
not know everything 1n 1t8 common genua.

This tollows, sinoe

many memories are lett in the mind trom the many Singulars known
with pertect intu1tive knowledge.

From these memories are known

those obJeots, relating to the Oond1tions ot ex1stence, not as
present, but a8 pa't' and in those oonditions ot existenoe those

objeots had~ln the past,Sa

scotus is a perfeotionist, ln the senSe that, whlle
.eeing the

~apsed

nature of man, he stl11 penetrates beneath this

.tatus down to the natural oapaolties themselves in the intellect
of man, and toreSe$s the resul ta these capaci tiel were foreor-

dained to produce.

To get a

~tter

view of these natural capa-

c1ties, sootus analyses the perteot status of knowledge as ••en
in the Angels and 1n the human! ty ot Ohrist and ln the beatifio

vis1on.

Though hindered and held down to earth by the senses,

sootus w111 nevertheless maintain that man hae these natural capa-

c1ti ••, say tor 1ntuition, however dulled in their lustre they
•

28 SOOtU8, Q:W!! glConl,ps!h Ill, d. 14, q. 3, n. 6. XIV,
527, 528; ••• Ver1tatea Gagnoaalbil•• cognitione intu1t1va de
existent1bua, ut exlstentla aunt, 801110et verltates oontlngentea, non posaunt oognoscl per speciea quascumque innata., quia ex
oognl tlone \ertilinorwn non potest 00gOO801 veri tas oomplexorwn contlngent1um de 1111s terminie, qu1a illarum oomplex1onum verita.
non lncludltur In terminia, sieut 1n speclebu$ at termlni8 earum
lnoludltuI' ver1ta. necessarla complexionalis sc1entlalls. oportet 191\ur propter verltatee contlngente', quae sunt de exletent1bu., ut exlstent!.. sunt, oosnosoenda.. babere allqua 00J801;& in
se praesentia, ut pos.lnt in .e intuItlve cognosol at vlderlJ at
hoc non potest tlerl in proprl0 genere, nisi Ips!. rebus in .e .eoundum suam exlstentlam praeeentlbus, 8t ita 111a cognltl0 lntu1tlva In gene;re proprl0 actuallS vel habltualls, non poteat dari
1111 anima. de omnibus, et quoad boc neOGsse est dicere quod protec1t, .10ut 8t a11a animal qula alla .t alla obJecta, al10 et
110 modo oognovlt. Slmil tel' quantum a\ intultl.am 1mperte01lam.
uae rellnqu1tur ex ls~ perfecta, quia de tallbu8 plur1bus pertecte intuItive cognlt1s derelictae sunt plures memoria., qu1bUs
gnoscuntur 111a obJecta quantum ad conditlone. existent1ae, non
t praes entla, ••4 ut praeter1ta, ad hoc dioo, quod .tlam s10 non
ov1t omn~a in genere proprio.

24
...,. be

as the result of the soorchlng etteot.s 01' origlnal sln.

"oreover , these oapacities tor dlreot knowledge are natural to

p.an, since God oreated man wlth these potentialitles

in

Hls In-

tlnlte Wlsdom.
To the obJeotlon that a present obJeot leaves only an
1ntellig1ble speoles in the intellect and an imaginable speoles
in the sensltlve faculty, the power 01' produo1ng the phantasm,
~ootus

rep11es that it leaves a memoratlve speole8, along with a

.ens1ble speoies in the phantasy.

The sens1t1ve faculty knows

the object, in 1tselt absolutely, apprehending 1ts qu1ddity.

"morat1ye faculty grasps the object

a8

The

1t was grasped in the

[Past, so that the past apprehension is the immediate obJeot, and
the immediate object 01' that past apprehension 1s the mediate obJect ot reoollect1on.
01' the

Ab8traot1ve knowledge

abst~aots

tbe speoies

qulddity, as 1t 1s a qulddity, trom the speoies in the

p~ta.m,

whioh represents the obJeot absolutely, not

lsts here and now or then.

~

it ex-

Intultive knowledge co-operates with

the intelleot, grasping 1ts obJeot as present 1n its aotual exlstence, and from this co-operat1on there results an hab1tual Intuitive oognlt1on held 1n the memorat1ve intellect.
tual intuitlve cognit1on is not

or

This habi-

the quidd1ty a.bsolutely, but

pr the th1ng known a. exist1ng, when 1t was perceived 1n the
past, as a once existing past experlenoe.29
29

~ •• 528:

Et s1 obJlo1tur quod eX re praesente

rr
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Al&ng with the proof trom sense analogy and conscience,

~ngpre

has in addition admirably summari$ed the proofs trom con-

~ingent

truths and memory_

He goes on to say:

Furthermore, all the judgments ot ex1stence that we
torm and that expreSs truths purely oont1ngent ~ [agts. are
cond1t1oned by the d1rect and 1ntu1t1ve v1ew of terms un 1ted
or separated by the intellect in the Judgment. The abstract
or univereal ooncept, since it does not refleot the aotual
ex1stence of objects, i$ incapable of signitying to the m1nd,
that the terms--subJeot and predloate--are un1ted or separated obJeot1vely. "It 1s not," adds sootus, "in the nature
ltself ot these terms that the understanding finds the reason
or the relation which establlshes
~ these truths, for
then these propos1t1ons would not be contIngent, but neoessary, a, all that is taken trom the nature of things." The

a

~on re11nquitur
~arte sensltiva
~oo talsurn est,

nis1 speCies lntellig1b1l1s in lntelleotu, et ln
.pecles lmaglnabil1s, ut 1n vlrtute phanta.tloa.
qula de re praesente non tantum rellnqultur ape~1es senslbilla 1n Phanta•. l •• sed allqua ln potentia memoratlva,
.' 111&e potentlae oognoscunt obJeotum sub alla et alla ratione;
I1am una oognoso1t obJectum secundum s. ab&olute. apprehendendo
~uidditat.m eJus, alla apprehendit obJeotum. ut in praeter1to ap>rehensum. ita quod apprehenalo praeterita est imme4iatum obJeo~um. at obJectum immedlatum illlu8 apprehensionls praeter1tae est
~bJeotum mediatum recordatlonls.
Ita etlam praesente aliquo sen~1bl11 aenaul, potest v1rtute 1111us cau.arl in lntelleotu duplex
lognltio, una ab&trao1;1'V&, qua intellectu8 &gens abatrablt specl~m qulddltatis, ut qu1ddltas est, a spec1e in phant&amate, quae
~praesentat obJeotum aoaolute, non ut existlt hio et nunc vel
iunC; et alla potest esae ln lntellectu 00gnlt10 intultlva, quae
looperatur lntelle.tui, et ab hao poteat derellnqu1 habitua11.
lognltl0 1ntu1tlva iIllportata 1n memoria lntellectlva, quae 81t
~n quiddltatls absolute, •
sed oogn1t1 ut ex1stens, quando
n praeterlto apprehendebatur, ut praeterl1t.
An exoellent commentary tollowa q. 3, 529-532.
For the doctrine ot Scotus on the agent intelleot as
~he ordered act1v1ty of reduoing the potential un1versal or 1n~el11gible to the actual universal or 1ntel11gible, and ot making
~he potentially understood Actually understood, and his dootrlne
~n the pOssible intelleot ae memory and lntel11gence, see Quaes~lone. ~u2dllbetalts, q. 15, n. 16, XXVI, 146, 141.
II

•
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attr1but1on of the pred1cate to a singular subject supposes,
then, the intellectual 1ntuit1on ot the concrete and of the
ex1stent1al. "Moreover," adds the l-iar1a.n Doc1;or, "w1 thout
intuition, the 1ntellective memory 1s lessened, tor it would
onl, conserve the 1ntelligible species 01' un1versal concepts
and not the representation 01' singular objects perceived in
their conorete ,..11tl.-30
We oome tinally to the flfth member of the qUintet ot
proofS in tavor 01' intu1t1ve knowled8e.

Th1s is the proof from

the natural capacIty of the human lntellect for the·beat1flc
vision.

Haunting Duns Sootus throughout his work is the status
of the human 1ntelleot as it operates un1ted to the body ln th1s
11fe, and 1t. proper status to behold God and the glorlfied Body
01'

Christ tace to faoe ln the beat1fic vlsion, in 1ts entltative

status.'l The beatIf1c vis10n 1s Intu1t1ve, Since 1t would be
impossible to have beatitude conslst ln the knowledge of an obJect, not. actually present and exist1ng, as ha.ppens through the

phanta.sm ln abstraotive knowledge, but ltmuet conslst in the
aotual taoe to tace vis10n ot God In HiS existential presence.,a
The intellect as an intelleot

has,

the oapac1ty to know singulars

d1rectly. the tmmaterial as well as the material, though al 1t
•

Modernity,

II:Jf)l5Pr', "The psyohology ot Duns scotus and its
42, 4,.

,0

31 Zacharias Van DeWoestyne, O.F.M., gYrsyt lhAlR!9Phl!UI, 2nd e4., Meohllnae, 193', II, 30-'2.
XXV,

~h
a.........

,2

Sootus, Quaest1qpes

QYgd11btt!l!~,

q. 6, n.

a,

rr

r

operates

1n~he

present life 1n conjunction with the body, 1t

graspS singulars 10 • hazy way, that ls, 1t apprehends vaguely
~be

flrst lntentions ot the specifl0 nature, or haeecelty.
Dorothea Ellzabeth Sharp presents observations on this

polnt worth1 of notice:
The intellect in 1tself • " " baa the power to know singulars • • •• Yet in 1 ts present lite being hindered by bodJ.
it can only vasuell apprehend them by gr••pine; oerta1n gen.
eral tirst intlnSipn!f of the hal-t'lta! such as numetical
unit1. ln4epen ent ex stence, an ncommunioab11ity."

,Since the b.e;'11'io vls10n 1s promised man, he must have
the capacity for recelving this vision, since the -necessary prerequisite for reoeiving any perf.ction, be It·natural or supernatural, acoidental or substantial, Is that the reclplent have
the capac11Jy to reoeive It."}4 A miracle or supernatural aooldent or substance cannot fultill this tundamental need.

Ohrist

cannot 61ve sight to a stone, unless he first make. it an eye.
God cannot.glve an angel or a human soul the vis10n ot Himself,
wi thout

putting into the angelic nature and the human nature at

lts creation the capacity to reoelve the beat1f1c vision.

Be-

cau•• of the need tor a natural capaol1q in aoquiring a pertec-

r----------------------------·
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,lon, whether natural or supernatural, -all knowledge, eVen that;
of the beatitlc v1s10n, 1s natural in the sense that 1t 1& 1n acoord with the nature ot

man.-'S

There 1s no specie. 1n 1ntuit1ve cogn1t10n.

Wh1le 'lihe

sens1ble 1mage intervenes 1n abstraotlve knowledge, -thiS
labOrat1on is not an absolute

n~c.s'1ty,

001-

based on the nature it-

s.l£ ot the soul--otherwlse, the 1ntellect could never attain God

and sp1ritual 8ubstanoe •• -,6 The collaborat1on of .ensible image
and 1ntellect 1s not en'li1rely the consequence ot origlnal 81n,
"slnce, even 1t it 113 1n the abaolute power 01' the 1ntellect to
know without the help of the sensible lmage, it 1s none the less
natural for the soul, united substantially to the bod7. to reach
also the real 01 way of the senses and of the lmaglnation.·31
The co-operation of intellect and imagination is partially explained bJ original sln, and part1ally by the natural order of
the soul .et up by div1ne Wl.don tor the present state ot our
11te.~

35 ll?.a.
~Oderni t1,

~6

Longpr',

53-

-The psychology of Duna Scotue and 1ts

37 llWi.
~.
38 sooius, ~ gX2n!§QSI. II, d. 3, q. 8, n. 1" XII,
~~5: Hoe non est ex natura nec leta oausa est absolute naturall.
usd est ex peocato .ed et1am e~ natura potentiarum pro atatu lato,

qu1dqu1d d1eat Auguatlnua.

rr
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The a.rgument trom the natural oapaoity of the human 1n-

tellect for the beatIflc Tlsion--to prevent violence being done
IJ.

natural fa.culty by changing its nature to reoeive a supernatura

perfeotion--completes the quintet of arguments in favor of Seotus·s positlon on intuit1ve knowledge.
wolter a.dds to the quartet of :proof..

Thls 1s the fifth proof

Shlre~l

has discovered.:

the Subtle Doctor establishes his theory of -intu1tive oognition, over and aboft the abatraCtlve. on the following ert
dencel firstly, by the fact of intelleotive memory; secondly
b7 analogy with sense knowledge which 1s intuitive: thirdly.
by reason of our knowledge of interlor a.cts whioh cannot be
adequa.tely explained by abstractlve knowledge; flnally, by
our knowledge of contingent truths 'which postulates intuitive knowledge.'9
As sense perceives the object directly. so does the intellect eminently.

We view our singular 1nter1or acts ot intel-

lect and. w11l directly..

ContIngent judgments would be mea.n1ns-

less, unless the mind joins the singular term of the subject d1rectly with the actual exlstence of the singular term of the predicate by intuitlve knowledge.

Memory of & species would never

reach the actual existIng object wIthout intuitlve knowledge.
With the specifI0 nature Joined to the common nature, eo that it
is onl7 formally distlnct trom it, since "it ls such in essence
and in ooncept that it can be thought ot by Itself, when 1t is

not another thing, thoush w1th that other 1t may be eo closely

Knowledge,

,9.t1l!tOyr1l
L.
Mod-1m

Shireel, O.'.M., "The Case for IntuItive
tighgolWUh XXII, May, 1945, 227.

rr
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united that~not even omnipotence can separate 1t."40 and with the
soul Joined to its faoulties in this manner, and the faoulties
amOng themselves, intuitive knowledge of the specific nature of

the 1nd1vidual being reaches the concrete ex1stence of the proper objeot of the intelleot.
It 1s the conoept ot being as the adequate and univocal
objeot of the intellect that will be taken up in the followlng
chapter.

r----------------------------------------~

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF BEING, THE ADEQUATE AND UNIVOCAL OBJECT OF THE
INSLLECT.. AS THE mODUCT OF ABSTRACTIVE
~'1)

INTUITIVE KNOWIEDGE

The formal object of the faculty of the intellect, as

also the result of the prooess of the intelleot*s aoquiring knowledge, indioates something ot the nature of the prooess tor ao-

quiring knowledge.

Consequentl,.. a study of the adequaoy and the

univacit,. of the ooncept of being as the object of the intellect
in the philosophy of Duns Bantus clarif1es the prooess of ab-

straotive and intuitive knowledge.

These two processes produoe

the univocal being of Duns scotus.
The material objeot of knowledge is the thing in itself
with its conorete existence; singular, ma:terlal, sensible, with

its proper and common sensible qualities, with its individuating
differences and. charaoteristio notes.

An individual book, a par-

ticular person are material objects ot knowledge.

The substan-

tial ma.terial form ot the material obJeot, or corporeal substanoe, is the bas1c raw ma.terial of our knowledge.

material

obJect~.

The material objeot

31

~

this 1s the

of the intellect

18 the phaetaem or sensible lmage produced in the proQess ot sens~tlon.

It is the intermediary in abstractlve knowledge.
The tormal objeot of knowledge may be the proper formal

object of the intelleot, or the common tormal object of the Int9l1eot •

For st. fhomas Aquinas the proper formal objeot ot the
lntel1eot 18 the essenoe of the sensible th1ng, beoause, since

we are forms in matter, the prinoiple ot proport1on demands we
knoW tis. form exlstlng individually in corporeal matter, but not,
as exist1ns in th1s ind1vidual matter."l

jeot of the 1ntellect as a faoulty tor St.

The common formal ob~homas

1s being as

such, since of the intellect there 1s one object Which comprises
all th1ngs known by the intellect. because nature is directed to
one

thins (otherw1se unproduct1veneas and inaotlvity would ensue

because of the lndeterm1nateness of the faculty to anyone detini te effect).2

On

the other hand. the proper forma.l obJeot ot

the intelleot. 1s being in
of Duns Scotus.3

tar as 1 t 1s belng in the philosophy

This adequate obJect of the intellect corres-

to the common formal object of the 1ntellect tor st. !ho-

ponds
, ... ,

80

I'

1

at. Thomas Aquinas,

~.

I-, I,

q. 85. a. 1, Baslc

~l~;Pf!,~*. n+°DHUl AgyiDAI, $d. Anton O. Pegls, New York,
2 Aquinas,,9._
Paris, 1872... 1880.

3 Seotue,

g,., II, 83, 9P!m Qp,pil, XII,

~

ed.. Vives,

QAonign§8, I, d. 3, q. 3, IX, 89, 90.

"

aas. 4 ~lhi1e no object but the most general oan be adequate to
the intelleot precisely as a faculty. for the present state ot
our ex1stence, the state of union of soul and body, the qu1ddity

of a sensible thing is adequate to the intellect as a motive.S
The primary. proper, and adequate object of the 1ntel-

lent for Duns Scotus 1s being. in so tar as it is being.

Being

in so far as 1t is being 1s the first, natural, and adequate obJect ot the 1ntellect, because the proport1on between the adequate object of the intellect and the faculty is a proportion ot
natural order.

The adequate object ofthe 1ntelleot 1s ot suoh a

nature that it moves the faoulty.

The faoulty is ot such a na-

'ure that it is moved naturally by th1s adequate obJect. 6

When

\h1s natural order between faculty and obJeot 113 present. the

natural order between mgti:v:mo and mg)a,lSh the moving and the movable, and consequently,. act

and

potency.7 then we have an object

5 Scotus f .2m!.i QloDimil. If d. ,. q. 3. n. 24, IX, 1

6 Scotus. Q2IDmI~ir.Ym ~ §'~tnk1a§t It d. " q. ,.
n. 14, IX, 98: ObJectum adaequatum et. potentia 810 proport1onatur
quod extremum ut eat obJectum adaequatum naturalitet>, poteat moTere potent1am, oauaando in aa cogn1t1(mem aUi, et potentia nata
est mover! natura.l1ter a tall obJecto.

7 Sootu8,.Qmul Ql2uleau, I. d. 3.

whioh 1s rtrat, natural, and adequate, and pert.ains to the Intelleot as a faculty.

Th1s natural order or adequation implies

s kind of proportion bettleOn object and faculty_

"POl' Scotus It

an object bl its very nature moves such and such an intellect.,
and an 1ntellect by its very nature is mot1vated by suoh and suo

an ObJeot. IlS
Although this natural order or adeQuation between fao-

ultY and obJeot ImplIes a proport1on, it does not imply a s1mi-

larity in the mode of being.

The faculty and the object are dis-

s1milar rather than simIlar.

The faculty and the obJeot are

"proportionate to the extent that a proportIon requires a dissImIlarIty of the things that are proportlonate. 1l 9 This dissIm1larity 1s found In tb.e proportIons of matter to torm, part to
the "hole, cause to the thing caused.
prInciple of proportIon of

Duns Scotu.s modifies the

st. Thomas bGt'tleen the modes

01'

beins

of faculty and object to determine tl18 objects of the Intellect:

beoause

lIe

are torms 1n matter,

wc)

know torms in matter; oon-

sequently the proper formal objeot or the intelleot is the essenoe of the material thins. 10 !be r.ason Sootu8 glvea for sub8 Shiroel, YNX291t[ s.t Bta.M JJl P.!aDA SQQliPa!h 48.
9 nis1•• 46.
q. 84, a.

L

10

st,.'fhomu Aquinas,

7, II, 808, 809,

1 . .t., I, q. 85, a. 1, II, 813:

q. 12, a. 4, I, 276.

,t1tut1ng n1s principle of natural order or adequation tor the
prinoiple of proportion of st .. Thomas is found in scotus's denial

of the similarity betl'reen the mode 01' being 1n the faculty and
object.

The faculty 1s actually the potency and the movable, and

consequently lt 1$ not s1mllar to the object, the act and the motivating element.ll

For sootus being 1s the adequate obJeot of the intellect according to mot1vation, Isuu.m&lWl x1£xHltlUh or virtually,

and accordIng to predicatIon.
BeIng ls the adequate object of the Intellect aocording

to' mot1vation. beoause of itself alone it can motIvate the intellect to a. knowledge Of itself and ot other things.

"Thus

.1DS oontains virtua.lly all thoae things which are .R!t. . . intellIgible by' the Intellect, and it1s only through this object

that different th1ngs are rendered Int-elllg1blEh ft12
divine essence alone and l2It.

a

Just. as the

aan mot1vate the d1vine 1ntelleot

11 8cotus,.Q.ma.a 2i:sn;tenQ. If d. " q. " n. 4, IX:
Oongruentla etlam lIla, quae adducl tur pro 111a. oplnione f nulla
est. Po~entla enim et obJeotum non oporte~ ass1milarl in modO
esmendi, se habent en1m ut motivum et mob1le. at 1ta se habent ut
dlss1ml11a, quia ut ac.tua,
potentia; aunt tamen propertionata,
qu1a ista proportl0 requlrit dlsalndlltud1nem proportlonatorum,
sieut oommuni ter d.lCl tur in omnl proportlonEJ. slcut patet de
materia et fOJlma, parte et toto, causa et causato, at ca.etaris
pMportlonall rue J 191tur ex modo eesendi talls potentla.e, non
poteet eoncludl s1m1l1s modus esaendl in objeot.

8'

12

Shireel, 0ni vgS1U 9L J3t2.M 111

~

Sgetug, 70.

to a knowledge of ltself,

80

belng

~ ~

and alone can motlvate

our intellect to a knowledge of ltself and other th1ngs.

Being

lS the adequate object of the intellect accord1ng to a RIt
natural motivatlon. 1'

~

or

The adequate object of a faculty according to motivation may vary aooording to

th~

the two types of motivation.

distlnctlon Scotus makes between

There 1s the motivation that pro-

ceeds from the verr nature of the faculty, and. the motivat1on
that proceeds from our present state of union of soul and bodyBeing is the adequate object of the lntellect according to the
motivat1on that proceeds from the very na.ture of the faculty_
The qUlddity of the sensible thlng is the adequate object of the

intellect acoording to the motivat1on that proceeds from our present state. l 4Be1ng la the adequate object of the lntellect acoording

to predication.

Being as such is the proper obJeot of the lnt81-

l' Scotus, 2! AnimA, q. 21, n. 2, III, 612, 613:
Sciendum quod duplex est adaequatl0 obJectl; una secundum vlrtutem ••• quod per se lp.sum solum poteat movere lntellectum ad
notltlam sul, at aliorum, sicut assentia dlv1na est obJeotum adaequatum prlmum intellectu9 divln1, quia est 8ufficlenter movens
lnte11eotum divlnum ad notlt1am eu1 primo, et allorum ex consequenti, at substant1a movet intellectum nostrum ad notltiam sui
primo, at ex consequent.1, ad notltlam proprlae passionls, vel
acoldentis.
72.

leet.

All things are known 1n virtue of their being.

Oonsequen-

tly all things, as the various objects of our intellect, are def1n1tely related to each other in virtue of their being.

For

this reason being can be said or predicated essentially of all

objects that come within the range of our knowledge.

Oolor, tor

example. is the proper object 9f the sense of sight.

Wh1teness

and blackness are known because they are colors, and beoause they

come w1th1n the range of the proper object of the sense of s1ght.
Consequently, color 1s essentially predicated of whiteness or .
blackness.IS Thus being is the adequate object of the intellect
according to pred1cation, beoause it is of its very nature and
essent1ally predicated of all things. I0
The adequate object of a faculty according to predioation may vary acoording to the distinot1on Scotus makes between

the two types ot pred1cat1on. .1a

~

predication, quiddltatlve

pred1cation,or predicatIon acoording to a primacy of commonness
d1ffers trom the pred1ca.tion accord1ng to a pr1macy ot implIes.15

~.J

11.

16 Seatue, ~ ~mi, q. 21, n. 2, III, 612, 61,:
Objectum autem adaequatum secundum praed1oationem e~t quod per se
et essent1a11ter praed10atur de omnibus, quae possunt e. pQtent1a
cognoscl, siout lux, vel color, vel oommune utr1que praedlcatur
essentla11ter de omnibus v1sib1l1bus: utraque autem prlm1tate adaequationis, ens est primum objeotum Intellectua noa\ri.

,8
tion,17 denominnt1 ve predicat1on, or predioa.t1on in
~

gUA.,_

l.n

predioation means the predication of the essenoe 01.' a sub-

Ject in whole or in part after the manner of an essence, after
the manner of subsisting, and not a.fter the mannerot merel, de-

nominating-

The predioation 01.' the whole essence 01.' the substan-

ce results in speciel.h

'!'he pred1cati.on of part 01.' the essenoe of

the substance results 1n genus.

A subject 1s predioated qu1ddI-

tatively 01.' Its inferiors whenever it is contained in its Interiors.

Since being is contained in genera, species, IndIviduals,

God and crea.ture, being is essentially or qu1ddi tati vely predi....

oated of genera, speCies, individuals, God. and orea.ture.
~

This 111

predIcation is made acoording to the primacy of commonness,

since being is common a.nd applicable to all things knOWable, mate

rial and immaterial.

In guaJ.1 predication, on the other hand,

means the pred1cation of the essence of a 8ubJeot or of an accident after the manner of denominating.

The predIcatIon of the

essence 1 teelf after the marmet' of denominating 1.8 subst.antial or

essential pred1cation and results 1n the speCIfic dIfference.

!h

pred1oation of an acc1dent after the manner of denom1nating 1s
accidental predicatIon and results in property, should the accl-

dent be convertible with the essenoe.

31.

l

If the pred1oat10n results

in an ultimate un1versal, 1t is a common accident.

Be1ng 1s de-

nomlnat1vely predicated of its tranacendentals: unity, truth, and
goodness, and of ultlmate differences, since belng 1s conta1ned
virtually, not quiddltatively, w1thin the transoendentals and ultimate difference, that ls, wlthin qualitative conoepta. 18 Being
is contained virtually within

~he

transcendentals, slnce being

comes into the definition of the transoendentals as something
added, not as something pertain1ng to their essence.

cendentals are pass10ns of being.
~

of its passions.

The trans-

Being cannot be predicated 1i1

Therefore being oannot be predloated quid-

ditatively of the transoendentals. 19

A

not1on predioated essen-

18 SoOtu8, Super YnlY~Ia.l11 E9rnbXr1t, q41 12, nn. 5.
6, I, 155: Praedlcarl enim d.1v1dltur in praedloa.r1, la~, at
111 gual;fh ta.nquam in per ae d1fferent1ae: quia 1st! aunt prim!
modi praed1candi. itl2d1suwl ill~, est praedlcare essentlam
subjeot1, per modum assentia., ld est, per modum subs1stentis, at
non denom1nant1s1 et hoc cont1nglt dupllc1ter; vel quod praedlaet
totam essentla.m subJeotl, e1:. al0 est SpeCies II • .. 81 vero partem
essentlae. s10 e8t Genus. 51 en1m totam lpSUlll Genus speo1el essentiam dioeret, sufflceret ad detin1endum Speclem, et Dlfferent!
8uperflueret. l!EAe41pAt3a 1n gug.J.I' est praed.lc&r1 per mOdumdenominant1s, quod contlngit dupllclter; vel quod praedlcet subJeot
essentlam, per modum denomlnantlaJ et tunc praedicatur lD. gual;1
,1Ub§l:a.ntr:tg.1Sh slve ,u!!!nt4ill. et s10 est D1fferentia • • • vel
ergo praedicat aocidens convertlbile, egredlens a pr1noiplls subjeot1, et. sic est proprlum; vel accidens commune, at s10 est ul ...
timum universale.

19 Seotue, ~ 002n1en~!, I, d. 3, q. " n. 6, IX,
103: Passle per sa secun~o modo praedioatur de aUbJeoto • • • •
irgo 8ubJectum ponltur in defln1tlone passlonls siout addltum ••
se4 81 ens cad1t in ratione earum ut addltum, ergo non est per se
pr1mo modo 1n ratione quldditat1vA earum.

tially or quidditatively of another is predicated univocally,
while a notion predicated

1n gual! or qualitatIvely ot other

notions i9 a un1vooal predicate. 20

Consequently from the stand-

po1nt of predication be1ng Is the primary adequate obJeot of the
intellect, because In being is found. the dual primacy of commonness and vlrtuality, since every

~ml

intelligible contaIns

wIthln ltself the formal £at~Q of being essentially

and

vIr-

tually.2l
Sooius distinguishes between the thins; and the n2!tlgn

,,6:

20 Sooius, .Qm:Ul 9atopll1UUh III, d. 7, q. 1, n. 5, XIV.
Aliud est un1vocum praedlcatum, aliud est univoce pJ;"aedlcarl
strlcte loquendo; Univocum praedioatum dlcltur oUJus conoeptus
est In se unus; et hoc modo album dIctum de ligno at de laplde
est praedloatum unlvocum; unlvoce autem praedioatu:r 11100. cUJus
ratio est Ita una, ut praedlcatu:r. quod ratIo eJus 1ncludltur 1n
ratione subjectI; et hoc modo denominativum non praedlcatur univoce.

21 Sootus, ~ Qxg~!nsi. I, d. 3, q. " n. 8, IX,
108, 109: Dlco quod ens est primum obJeotum Inte1lectus nostri,
quia In Ipso ooncurrlt duplex prlmltas, scl1lcet communltatis et
vlrtualltatls; nam arona per S8 lntelllg1blle aut lnoludlt essentlaliter ratlonem entls, vel contlnet vlrtuallter • • •• Omnia
enim genera. et specles et individ.ua, at omnes partes essentialea
generuttl. at ens Increatum: Ino1udunt ens quId.dltatlve • • • • Omnes
passlones entls Inoluduntur In ente, at In suls Inferiorlbus vlrtuallter • • • • Et ita patet, quod ena habet prlmitatem communi
tatls ad prima intelllgibl11a, hoc est ad conoeptus quldditatlvoa
generum, speolerum, Indlvlduorum; et partlum essentlallum omnium
lstorum at entls Increatl at habet pr1mltatem vlrtualltatls ad in
telllglbll1a Inolusa in prlmls Intelllg1bl11bus, hoo est, ad conceptus quallflcativos dltterentiarum ultlmarum at passionum proprlarUJ%h
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". have

or

the thing.

In reality being and. the transoendentrt.tls

are convertible. In reality being is analogous. Oonceptually,
bowever, being and the transcendentals designate distinct not!
-here a slmple converslon no longer holds, for be.ne; oannot be
predicated of its transcerdentals essentially."22

Being as a

ooncept Is univocal in character "on the grounds ot its oommonness applioable to all things knowable. material or lmmaterial.tt

To better understand the :rela.tlon to heine; of' the
cendentals Scotus distinguishes between "!.§.U.
"Jsse U!m e§s§n;t.if&l2.:YPr'«

a

§saentii" and

"1'0 'be of the essenoe" presupposes

"to be the same essentially", but "to be the same essentially"
does not presuppose "to be of the essence" j since ".t.!U1I. U el!ltD....

11&." is that lolhloh Is Included

~

AI. in the quidd.Itatlve oonoept

ot the essenoe and oonsequently is contained. In Its qulddltatlve
£lift'P, and Is not an addltion..

On the other hand, a thing can

"be the same essentially" even though it is outside the oonoept

ot essence, as un1 ty and truth for eXClmple. whIch are outside the
conoept of being which 1$ prior to un! ty and. truth, but 1s not

...

23

.rusl. It 84.
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really different from unity and truth. 24

Consequently, Itthe

transoendentals are not of the very ooncept of

are,

PllnS

Itself but

nevertheless, identioal with 1t."25
Not only is beIng the &dequate obJeot of the intellect

acoording to the adequaoy of motivation and predioation.
1s the un1vocal object of the

BeIng

I~telleot.

The conoept of be1ng 1s the univocal object of the in-

tellect. beoause being is oontained essent1ally or virtually in
all thIngs or ooncepta by right of an JJl ml.1!1 or an

1n

gUill pre-

dioation, and beoause the oonoept of be1ng 18 the product of abstractIon and intu1tion.

Be1ng, as the object of abstract10n and

of 1ntuitIon, is a hIgher ,degree of being than the being that is'

the object of abstraction alone.

Oonsequently, being, as the ade-

quate obJeot of the intellect, and as the product of abstract10n
and 1ntui tion, 1s p.redioated only un1 vocally, beoause being is

predIcated or known 1n the same sense that it 1s apprehended br
24 Scotus, In MetiPhy!.gmm At1§totel.a, VII. Q. 1,
n. 2, VII, 351: Non enim idem est esse de assentia A, at esae idep
essentialiter vel rea1iter ips1 A. P.r1mum quidem lnfert secundum
led non e converso, qu1a de assent1a A praeo1se est 111ud. quod
1ncluditur per ss 1n conceptu quidditat1vo A, at ideo pon1tur in
ratione eJus quidditativ8., non ut addltum; poteat s.utem esse
rea11ter ips1 A 1dem, 110et s1t extra conceptum ejus, puts. unitas
ver1tas, etc. extra oonceptum entis, qui prior est 111is, secundum Avioennam 5. non tamen 1111. dicunt rem a11am ab ente.

133, 134.

25 GraJewskl,

~ F2rmA~ D11l~Dgk1Qn

2f

DunA

sg9~U!,

...

the intelleot. and becaus. beIng des1gnates both the nature of'
the sens1ble quiddity and the very act ot exIstence, or the very
exIstence at th1s &ot. 26 G1lson says that beIng as the ad.quat.
object of the Intellect implies the univocity

or

being, beoause.

11' the intelleot has being tor its proper object, the intellect
must be able to grasp being by a unique aot, and, consequently.
to know it in the same sense in which the speoies

or

be1ng 1.

apprehended. 27
Soatus proves being 1s the un1vooal objeot of the intelleot by showing Aristotle t • prino1ple of oausality presuppose.
univooal predioation.

Aristotle says "a thing has a quality in a

hIgher degree than others if in virtue of it a siml1ar quallt7
longs to the other things as well."28

A cauae that imparts a pe

fect10n to some thIng enjoys that perfeotlon ln a higher degree
than the effect rece1ving the perfection.
the cause ls a univocal cause.

26

This is true only if

Fire is the hottest ot all things

Shircel J UmyqglSt:r: 2t _~ In Jbm.I. ;}gS.r~l:l'h 79 J 80 •

27 Etlenne Gllson, "Avlcenne et 1& Poln; de Depart de
Duns Seot," j£gh1y¥, ~'Hi§~91~ POPir1nl1 ~ L1~t!~trt ~ MRXtD
Ast, Parls, 1927 •..• 10 : El e imp lque 'univoclt de lTitre;
oar a1 l*lntelleot a lt~tre pour objet proper, 11 dolt pouvoir 1.
aalsir par un Elote unique, et par consequent le connaltre dana 1.

!

mime sense quell. que solt ltespece de l'itre apprehends.

28 Aristotle, Het~hlalg§, II, 1, 993b, The Works 2t
Arlstotll. trans. Wm. David Ross t OXford, 1940, 23.

because it"'is the univoca.l oause of all heat.

If fire were not a

univocal cause, but an analogical cause or an equivocal one, t
f,he sun sou1d be the hottest of a.ll things, and not heat. 29

Aristotle continues, tttha.t which causes derivative truths to be
trUe is most true."3Q

Unless truth be predioated univoca11,. of

bOth first principles and of Qther things, it w11l not follow, as
in the caS8 ot heat, that f1rst principles must be most true beoause they are the cause of truth in other things.,l

Aristotle

oono1udes that "as each thing is in respect of being, sO it is 1n
respect of truth.":52
sreatest being.
the cause

That which is the cause ot being 1s the

This presupposes univoca.l predica.tion.

ot being;

God 1s

God is the greatest being; therefore being is

univoca1ly predicated of God and creature."

29

Shiree1, YDJ.xog1U J2.t

30 Aristotle,
'1 Sh1rosl,

~!t~bls1gi'

Yp1Iog1~X ~

32 Arlatotle,

Be~ns

1n D.!:m&l Scgtug, 81.

II, 1, 99'b, 23.

ilins 1n ~

Me~IRhx§lg ••

ag2M~I'

81.

II, 1, 99,b, 23.

"
Scotus, ~ An1mAt q. 21, n. 1, III, 615: Ostendo
per intentionem PhI1osophi 2, Metaphysioae, text. 4 dlcentls,
quod. unumquodque est maxims tale, quod est causa, quod a11a. sunt
Univoce talia, ut ignis es~ calIdlss1mua, quia est causa un1vooa
oaloria in all0, non autem hoc est verum de cauaa analogioa, vel
aequivooa, quia tunc aequeretur, quod Sol esaet oalidisalmus, et
aubdi t quod Rl:~JJU& pr:1Ug2.12"1 ~ ysr1§sa..t quIa aunt causa. veri\atla In aliis, quod non sequeretur, ut dictum est, nisi verltas
41ceretur 1n utr1sque univoce; sed 8ubdlt, I~qyt ~ DiRfDf a4
~. !1£ ~ yer1li~!m; 19ltur quod est causa entltat1a a l1a,
'8~maxlme ens: a1 tamen ena dieatur de eis univoca, non alIter,
Cum 19itur Deus sit causa entltatls all1s, at dlcatur maxims ens,
Oportet quod ens dlcatur de Deo, at creaturis univace.
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The seoond proof Scotue gives for baing as the univooal
obJeot of' the lntelleot follows from the denial tha.t being is predioated of other things on the basis that the conoept ot being
corresponds to God essentially and to creatures by partioipation.

The concept of belng does not 'correspond essentially to God, because, if the 1ntellect has a conoept proper to aome one object,
then the intellect can distinguish that object from every other
object through the concept.

Th1s 1s true because a conoept that

1s proper to one objeot

not oorrespond to other objects.

d09S

It

the concept of being is not univooally common to God and to
creature, then that ooncept wl11 be proper to God a.lone: it wl11
correspond to God essentlally and prinoipally, and to other th1ng
only by partioipation.

Therefore, through the oonoept of being

alone we could distinguish God from oreature.

This is false,

since t}-l..,rough t'tt..e ooncept 01.' being we know God only in a oonrused
manner, in so tar as we know God through a concept common to Him

and to creature.

Oansequently, since a. proper conoept of God 1s

impossible, there must be a common or univocal concept, predicated un1vocally at God and creature, not analoGically nor equl-

vocally.,4

-

)4 ~., 615, 616: Non dlceres ens analogice, vel &8quivoce praedloarl de alliS, nisl qula conceptus entis convenit
Deo per essentiam, allis autem per partic1pat1onem. Sed quod non
convenlat Deo per essentlam, probatio; intelleotu8 enim habens
eonoeptum proprlum alicuJua obJeot!, poteat illud per lllum conceptum distlnguere ab omnl all0, quia 111e conoeptus, qui est un!
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1.he final proof Sootus gives for the univocal predication of being states that no real conoept is caused in the intellect of man naturally unless it be by those things whioh natu~ally

motivate our intelleot.

But the things whioh naturally

motivate our intelleot are the phantasm, or the obJeot shining i
the phantasm, a.nd the active 1,ntellect.

Therefore no simple con-

oept enters the intellect naturally, except in virtue of the
phantasm and the agent intellect.

But a ooncept that would not

be univooal to the object as it shines in the

phantasm, the onlY

othel" possibility, would be different from the object and prior
to the object.

This conoept would be analogous.

An

analogous

concept of this nature, however. oannot be caused by the phantasm
and the aot1ve intellect; because any object shining in the phantasm or the intellig1ble spec1es, by means of the aot1ve or the
passive intellect, aooording to the ultimate of its power, as an
effect adequate to itself in the intellect, forms a oonoept proper to itself, and a. conoept of all th1ngs lncluded in it essentially or vlrtually.
r

The assumed analogous ooncept is

neit.~

I

proprius, est incomposslbilla all1s: sed a1 conceptus entis non
est communis un1voce Deo, at oreaturae, ll1e erit proprlus Del,
at oonvenit Deo per esaentlam, at prlnolpallter, at a111s per
partiolpat1onem. ut supponltur; 19itur 1ntellectuB noster per
conoeptum entis potest dlstlnguere Deum a creatura, quod. talsum
est: per oonceptUID. eolm entis cognosoimus Deum confUse tantum,
prout habet cum all1s unum conceptum oommunem.

r
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the proper concept, nor is it included in that proper conoept
essentially or virtually.
not

For this reason a proper concept can-

an analogous oonoept.

be

To rely upon an analogous concept

to know God would mean that we would never actually oome to know
God.

must

Since this ls false, the assumptlon of an analogous oonoept
be

talse.

Therefore, being must be univooal in its predi-

cation of God and oreature.'5
The

same argument that God cannot

be

known by the human

intelleot naturally, unless the concept of belng is univooall,.
predicated of the Oreator and the oreature, hOlds good on the
same bas1 s for substance and aocident.

A

un1 vocal ooncept

and

univooal pred1oation 119 as neoessary to know God as lt 113 to know
substanoe.

A substance does not immediately mot1vate our tntel-

35 Scotus, ~ OXRn1I~I!h I, d. " q. 3, n. 8, IX,
19: Nullus conoeptus ree:l"fs causa Ur in lntellectu viator1s naturaliter, niSi ab hls quae aunt naturaliter motiva intelleotus no
tri, sed 11la aunt phantasms. vel objectum relucens in phantasmate
at lntellectuB agens; ergo nulluB conceptus simplex tlt modo naturallter in lntellectu nostro. nial qui poteat fieri virtute istorum. Sed conoeptus, qui non ssset univocus alieul obJecto relucentl in phantasmate, sed omnino alius et prior, ad quem lste
haberet analogia.m. non poaset fierl vlrtute lntellectuB agent!s
at phantasmatis, ut probabo; ergo talls conc~ptus alius analogus,
qui ponitur na.turaliter in lntelleotu vlatoris numquam erit, et
ita. non poterit natul"allter haberl allquis conceptus de Dec, quod
est falaum. Probatl0 assumpti, objectum quodoumque, slve Nlues
in phantasmate. sive in specie intelllg1bill cum lntellectu asents vel posslbl1i cooperante, secundum ultumum suae virtutis tacit
in intellectu, slout affectum sibi adaequatum, eonceptum suum pro
prium, at conceptum omnium esaentiallter vel v1rtuallter 1nclusorum in lato, nee est lste; ergo 111e non fiat ab allquo tale
movente.
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leot to a knowledge of Itself, but only medIately through a sensible accIdent.

Consequently there 18 no quidd1tatlve ooncept of

Bubstance, unless It be the concept abstracted from the concept
of a.ccldent.

Slnce no qulddltatlve ooncept can be a.bstracted

~

the ooncept of a.ocident exoept the conoept of being, it follows
that, slnoe be1ng 1s unIvOOa.1, .1t must be predloated unlvoca.lly
of SUbstance and accldent.36

at.
tellect.

~homa.A

dlstingulshes tW() objects of the human In...

Because of the unlon of soul and body, the human Intel-

lect knows the essence of materlal or sensible things through the
abstractive process of the active intellect.

th1s object 1s pro-

portlonate to the human faoulty of knowledge: slnce we are forms
in matter, we know forms In matter, or the quiddit1es of mater1al
th1ngs.

The essenoe of the sensIble thing ls the proper object

or the proper formal object of the intellect.

By reason ot the

faculty consIdered as a faculty, the human lntellect knows b$lng
as such, the common

£1&19

of all thIngs abstracted from realIty.

O'B

36 scotus, £m!.!
PIen,!!; I, d. 3, Q.t; 3, n. 9, IX,
1091 S1cut est e.rgutum, quod eus non est a nobls cognosclbl11s
naturaliter. nisi ens sit univocum creato at lncreato. Ita poteat
argui d.e substant1a et accidente; cum enim substantia non 1mmutet
1mmediate lntellectum nostrum ad a11quam intel1ectionem sul, sed
ta.ntum accidens senslblle, seqUitur, quod nullum conceptum quiddI ..
tativum habere poterimus d.e ea nisi slt a1Iquis talls, qui poss1t
abstrahl a conceptu acoident!s; sed nullus talls qulddltatlvuB.
abstrahlb111s est a conceptu accldentia nIsI conceptus entla,
erso, etc.

r
Being as allah 1s the adequate or common object ot the human Inte11eot. 37 Be1ng 1s the tirst 1ntel1igib1e and the proper obJeot
of the human intellect, because ttwe can conceive nothing other...

wIse than as a beins."38
Duns Sootus 11kew1se dist1ngu1shes two objects of the
human intellect.

ScotU8

subst~tutes

for the prinoiple ot pro-

portion the pr1nciple of natural order, a modif1ed princIple of
proport10n.

The primary object of the intellect 1s that which 1.

common to all 1l'te111g1b1es.

This 1s be1ng as such.

Therefore,

being as such is the primary. proper, and adequate objeot of the
Because of the present state of un10n of soul and

intellect.

body, the qu1dd1ty of the sensible thIng is also an object of the

The quiddity of the sens1b1e thing 1s the proper or

intellect.

adequate object by reason of the present state.39
From the v1ewpo1nt of the objects

o~

the inte1leot the

doctr1nes of Duns 3cotus and St. Thomas seem similar.

From the

viewpoint of being they seem40 radically d1fferent.

'7

Shiroel, Un1voclty of Being 1n Duns Scotu8, 84, 85.

3S lli4. t 68.
39 l.l;;>j4. t 85.
40 R. P. Phillips, Ho4«u'n Ihom&IJle&g Philgsophy, London, 1939, II, 171: tI • • • 1t 1s bY' no means clear that Scotusts
own assertion that belng 1s univooal with respeot to the ten oate
sories and to God and oreatures, i8 reallY' 1n contradiction with
the view ot St. Thomas that 1t 1s not. Th1s may seem rash to sug
geat after centuries of heated controvers1, but the questIon 1s

TBe belng of st. Thomas is the object of abstraction
alone.

Belng tor St. Thomas 18 that to which corresponds exls-

tence.

It ls the result of the prOCess of abstraction of the ac-

tive intellect whioh separates the eesence of the ma.teria.l thing

from its material trappings, which hlnder intelligibIlity, to
present the common

rA~l2

cretely exIsting things.

ot all things as abstracted from conSinoe this belng ls abstracted from

reallty whioh is sensible. it will natura1iy follow that it is
predicated of a pure intelllgible suoh as God in a sense partly

the same and partly ditferent,--the same by reason ot existence,
but different in essenoe,--that is to say. analogously. "and be-

oomes available only when oorreoted by all the necessary nega-

tions."41

Being, oonsidered in relation to its inferlors, falls

under the analogy of proper proportionality a.nd. of attrlbutlolh
.. Formally.. belng 1 s analogous by an analogy of proportl cnali ty ,

for its unity oonsists in the unity of the relation or proportion
of every belng to its existence.

Vi.rtually, hOliever, being is

\fhether the being of whioh Scotus a.sserts and S" Thoma.s denies
tha.t lt is univocal are really the same "being". Both agree that.
belng is not a genus, a.nd t.his admission on Sootus·s part would
make his asse~lon that lt i8 unlvocal unintelligible, if he attaches the same meaning to "being" that St. Thomas does. In fact
1t s-eems tha.t the "beingft which Sootus ls speaklng of 1s not that
belng ln general arrived at qy abstraotlng the essence of sena1bl
things, which, aocordlng to 6t. Thomas, ls the proper object of
the human intelleot, but merely the very nct of ic.,MiDS apart
from any further determinat.lon."

51
analogous

by

an analogy of attribution, inasmuch as belng ls

found ln a more perfect mode in SUbstance than in aco1dent."42
For at. Thomas the a.nalogy of proper or metaphys1cal proport1onality 1s an analogy according to intention and aocordins to eS8e,
that ls, in concept and in reality,

~s1nce

the th1ngs to which

the terms are app11ed are not tdentioal or exactly the same either in intention or in ti.U..
stanoe and accident.

Thus be1ng 1s pred10ated ot sub-

Here the common nature, being, 1s justif1ed

in its reference to substanoe and accident sinoe both are necessarily be1ng. 4,

Substanoe and aoo1dent, however, are being ac-

cord1ng to an order ot greater or less perfect1on.

In th1s 1s

found. the1r divers1ty.44 The ana.lo'gy of attr1bution 18 an analogy acoording to intention alone and not acoording to !!Il. that
is, an analogy in ooncept alone.

This analogy 1s present when

one intention refers to many things aocording to an order of
priority

and.

posteriority. although this intention 1s found to ex«

1st aotually only in one of the references.

Health, for example,

exists intrinsically and formally and after an order or priority
in

th$

principal analogue. animal, but by an order of extr1nsie

denomination and after an order of posteriority in the minor ana-

42

Shiroel. YntI92~\1 .2.t 13Jtj.M in ~ SpotM!!. 13 ..

4,

~

...

11, 12.

44 St. Thoma.s Aqulnae.1n ,S!!ntelmta.s. I, d.. 19, q. 5,
a.. 2, ad 1: (Analog1a) seoundum intentionem et seoundum esse, at

r
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f

logues. fooa and pulse. 4 5
The being of Duns Sootus, on the other hand J is the object of abstraction and intuition.
the Ideal quiddlty of being.

Abstraotive knowledge reaohea

In abstractlve knowledge the

11g1ble speoles moves the intelleot.
belng directly in itself.

i~te~-

Intuitive knowled.ge views

In intultive knowledge the objeot it-

self as present moves the intellect.

Duns scotus believes intui-

tive knowledge is neoesaary to grasp the indlvidual being in its
entlret,.*

lntul ti ve know1ed.ge is a more perfeot klnd of know-

ledge than abstraotlve knowledge, sinoe it grasps qulddity and
existential presenoe.

"BtlnS as the product of both abstraotion

and intui tlon is deolded.ly broader and of a more general charao-

ter than the btlW) ot St. Thomas.

Viewing

w1ns

1n th1s lIght,

it was but logical tor Scotus to postulate the unlvocity ot
beIns_"46

The belng of Duns Scotus reminds you of the pure inde-

terminatIon of Plotinu8, eo that
When Duns ScOtu8 says that what fIrst fallS under the
intellect 1s belng he no longer therefore understands with
St. Thomas the nature of the sensIble belng as such. but ex~
1stenoe 1n 1tself, without any determ1nat1on Whatsoever, and.
taken in 1ts pure lntelllg1bl1lty.47
45 ~.: (Ans.log1a) seoundum Intentlonem tantum at
non seoundum esse, et hoc est quando una 1ntentI0 refertur ad
plura per pr1us at posterius quae tamen non habet esse nls1 in
uno.

46

Shireel, Ylll!gsl~;r .91 :§IlM 1n Duns Sg0!ru§. 85.

47 Gllson,.Ib.t. §pi;cl5 at Me41IDl fhlJ.qs2Pby, 263, 264

5'
DUns seotus makes a d1st1nction between two aota ot the
intellect on the level ot simple apprehension, or the 1ntellect10n of a simple objeot.

the abstractive act ot the intellect

can be indifferent to an object as existing, and as not ex1stlng,
and oan also be indifferent to an obJeot not really present. as

well as to an objeot really present.

We frequently experience

this act w1thin us, since we understand universals or the quiddities ot things equally as well, whether they naturally possess an
objective existence in some substanoe. or not, and whether they
be

there is an A IZ9.8\!J':lor1

present or absent to the intellect.

proof for this kind of abstractive knowledge.

The knowledge ot a

oonclusion, or the understanding of a principle persists 1n the
intelleot equally as well, the thing existing, the thing not ex1stlng: the thing present, the thing absent.

Since the one way

or the other there 1s produoed the act of knoWing a oonc1uslon or
understanding a principle equally as well, oonsequently there 18
produced equally as well the 1ntellection ot that extreme--whether the minor proposition of the syllo51sm or the predicate of
the judgment--on whioh depends the understanding of the nexus of
the oonolusion, or of the principle.

On

the other hand. the in-

tuitive aot of the intelleot, not as oertalnly exper1enced within
us a.s the a.bstra.otlve act, centers upon an objeot present and existing, as present and eXisting, because the 1ntellect should
possess in an eminent degree the perfection of the sensitive tao-

....
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ulty.

Just~aa

the proper object of the sense faculty ls the sen-

sible thing, as present and exlstlng, so the proper object ot the
intellect is being, adequate

and

univocal,

as

present and ex-

lstIng.48
Dune Scotus appreciates the dichotomy of Intellect
singular realIty, and the abyss between creature and Oreator.

and

He

endeavors to maintain by princIple the unIty that shines through
the evIdent fact ot reallty.49

To aooomplish his project, Scotus

-

48 Baotus, Qua,8§:t.12nt! g.UQ~JJb.!lt§!I!' VI, 8" XXV, 24, t
244: • • • distingultur de duplloi actu lnte lectus, et hoc 10-

quendo de slmpllo1 apprehena1one, sive intellectione obJectl s1mpllcls, unus Indifterenter poteet esse reepectu obJectl existentIS, et non ex1stentIs,et 1nd1fferenter etlam respeotu obJectl,
non reallter praesentls, s10ut at reallter praseentis: 1atum aetum :frequenter experimur in noM's: qUla unlveraalIa, slye qulddltates rerum 1ntel11g1mus aeque. s1 ve habeant ex natura rei .!..Ii!.
extra ln allquo 8upposlto, slve non: et Ita de praesent1a at abaentia. Et etiam hoc probatur a posterlori; qula aoientia conclusionia, vel intelleotu8 prIncipII aequo in 1ntellectu manet,
re exlstente, et non ex1stente, praesente, vel absente: et aeque
poteat baberl aotus eoleDd1 oonolusionem t et intelllgeDd! princlpluml ergo aeque potest haberl 1ntellectl0 extremi Il11us, a
quo late actus lntelllgend1, quI sc!entlt1cus die! poteat, quia
praev1us, e~ requisltus ad '91£1 oonolusionia, et ad tntell~Slr!
pr1noipil, potest satis propria diel abstraotlvus, quia abstrahlt
obJectum ab exlstent1a , et non existential praesentia., et absentia.
Alius autem actus intelllgendl est: quem tamen non lta
certltud1nallter experlmur 1n nobia: poss1bI11s tamen est talls:
quI, soll1oet praeo1se f1t obJeot1 praesent1s, ut praesent1s: at
eXistentis, ut exlstentls. Hoc probatur: quIa, omnis pertectio
cognlt1onis absolute, quae poteat eompetere potentiae cogn1t1vae
senaltivae, poteet em1nenter competere potentlae eogn1tlvae Intellectlvae • • •

...

55
sees the ntfOesslty tor post.ulating a. type 01' being as adequate 0
ject to the 1.ntelleot. that is common to the materia.l a.nd the im-

material. by' the oommonness of untvoolty, that is the product of
abstraction and lntultlon,ln a word, univocal being.

Being; as

objeot- Of the 1nt..Ileot, enjoy. the primacy of motivation
predi cat1 on.

e.nd

of

Being, from the aspeot of motivation, is that ob-

Jeot whioh motivat.es the intellect

~A&

and

naturally, extend-

ins to things mater1al and immaterial, and not to a.bstraotlol'ls
tram the mater1a.l alone t

:Betng as the primary object of the in-

telleot from the point of view of predication, "is that object
which can 'bf& predloated of all thins- without exception, but not
in the ident1cal way.

Of

Ilmnlll~~1£

simple concepts, of ulti-

mate d1fterences and transoendentals, bf!1Di is predicated JJ1

!n gmSL or qu1dditatlvel1."SO 1A gllw' predicatIon 18 univocal predioa.tion. 1A

9YAJ.I; of all other things it i . predioated

QYii! predioat1on results 1n the univocal pred1cate. since 'being

and

l'mR~iQ'~1E

simple concepts are oonta1ned within oth$ra wh1ch

just,lty a univocal predioat1on. they ere oalled univocal predl.
oates in virtue of this essential pr$d.ioat1on.51

Consequentl,-,

for Scottle there 1s rigorous unity: the mind. indeed does
¢,

q

,..

U t

50 Shiroel, Y»J,XSl9t,t,z at lIl,ni J..n DJmI ~9g:ti!aJh 86.

51

...

'kl" .
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nott only attain the «fexolusive 1ntell1gible," but 1t grasp.
also by intu1t1on. and in a direct manner. the matter 1tselt
of the Judgments, namely. thEt singular and mater1al object,
.and. all that 1s the objeot of experience and. sensibility.
Thus. thanks to an 1ntul tion of the conorete and eXistent1al
Ena. all the order of ceneeptl 1s solidly anohored to the
real tU'ld brought back to un! \,." 52
.
Just as un1 vooal being 2. a the product of abstraction
and 1ntult1on. ao also 18 th1s .ind,lvidual being knowable by in...
tuition and abstraotion.

fbi. univocal

u~&ga

as the primary.

natural and adequate ob.1eo\ of the intellect 18 more oommon 1n
its oharaoter than the aensible, • _ " 1t 1s an object which 1.

essentiall, 1noluded in every llIE

a

intell1gible, whether mate-

rial or immater1al, • • • 1t 1$ not limited but unlimited, ·and
heMe all-inclusive. "53

The \Ul1vocal and adequate obJ$ct of the

1ntellect is common to every material and immaterial 1nd.iVidual.
We have also seen that Dune Sootue emphasizes the a ....

ti,.. fa.tor belonging to the ;itrJi£! of an objeot. of reaUty. as
the prlnolple of' aot1v1t.y, a.s opposed to 1ta more or les. atatio
The obJeot acts as a motlvat ins agent to oo-operate

tlUUUUla.*

with the agent intellect to efteot1vely and termlMtlvel1 pro-

duoe the ooncept.

Between abject and m.1nd there stands the real

relation of the mot! vatlng factor of real! \1 to the movable Inj

'.

Modern1 tr J

68.

f

hi

~

rf

,cPT

I

longpre, "The Psychology of Duns Seot.ue and its
76.

53 Sh1roel, Y1d:ISUt1~X U It,,ib5 Hl ~ 151~t»Jb 61,
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telleot,

as also

the real relation of the measurable intelleot to

the th1ng measuring the intelleot.54 The foundation of t.hese two
terms 1s found In the adequo.oyand univocity ot being to the in-

tellect.

The nexus between the mind and the object is disoovered

1n the abstractive and Intuitive knowledge of the indiv1dual
Being.
These principles of Dune Scotus to the mind. ot LongpreI

resolve the Xantian antinomies that propose the paradoxioal dichotomy between the oreature and the Creator, and between sensation and intellection.

On the basis of univocal being as the

adequate and proper object of the intellect, and on the basIs ot
its pred1cat1on

in ~ or essentially of genera,

Viduals, God and. crea.ture and of its predication

speCies, indi-

J& gUi.1 or vir...

tua.lly of transoendentals a.nd of ultimate differenoes, resulting
1n the univocal predicate, Seotue has brought together the extremes of unoreated being and. created being.

Secondly, on the

basis of the intuitIve knowledge of the singular, Scatue has pro-

vided the binding link or nexus between the processes ot sensation and intellection.
By plaoing 1n the Ens the proper object of the intelleot and
attributIng to the transoendental conoepts a representative
value and a OOmmon intelligibility or of univooal oontent,

507-5'9.

r-

,

"

whatever may be the objects to which they are app11ed, Soow
tUB has brought together the tirfO extremes of being-the worle
and God--and at the same time by d1rect and univooal application of these transcend.enta.l notions, surpassed Kantla.n
agnosticism. tr18 solution of the seoond ant1nomy is offered
not less surely.by the Soot1st1c psychology of 1ntuition,
and of d1reot knowledge of the singular.55
For an idea of the un1ty Scotus believes to ex1st in
being and between the faoulties of the soul before the opera.tion

of the intelleot we will consider in the next chapter h1s theory

of the formal distinction.

l.foderni ty.

i575.
LongprJ,

"The Psyohology ot Duns Scotus and its

CHAPTER III

THE FORf.1AL DISTINCTION. FINDIliG INSEPARABLE THE INDIVIDUALITY
FROM TH.E COMl4.0N NATURE. AS \'lELL AS THE SENSITIVE FACULTY

FROM THE INTElLECTUAL FACULTY. AS THE BASIS

FOR INTUITIVE KNOWIEDGE

To understand intuitive knowledge better it is helpful
to understand the oonst1tutive elements of the object ot 1ntuiti ve knowledge, the 1ndivi du a.l beinS. and ot: the faculty or know-

ledge, the sensitive and. lntelleotual powers.

The individual

being 1s composed ot its individuality of b.aecceity and or the

oommon nature. both formally distinot.

The sensitive power

ot

the soul is also formally distinot rram the intellectual potier.
As the real distinction between the constitutive elements ot Tho-

mistic being, essence and eXistence, lends itself to a.batraotlve
knowledge, since the rea.lly d.ist1nct essence can be separa.ted.
from the existence by the power of the a.gent intellect, so an

identity between the individuality a.nd. the common nature lends
itse1t to intUitive knowledge, since the indiVidual being is a.otually present to the intellect in its ooncrete existenoe.

With

the sensitive faculty really distinot from the intelleotive raculty, the agent intellect "1111 na.turally abstraot its speCies
59

..

frOm the sense phantasm.

Wi th the sensl tl ve po,.,er identIcal wit

the intelleotive power. tho Intellect will partake to an emInent

degree of the senses t power of intu! tIon, since the proper object
of the intellect is the indivIdual being, just as the proper object of the sense is the singular material thIng.

For a better understanding or the formal distInction
and its relatIon to In'tuitive knowledge a fe,., words on the nature

of a. rorma11ty are in order ..
Allan Wolter. O.F.M., says that a fairly aocurate and
intellIgible notIon

o~

a I'formalitytf is Uto consider it as the

objeotive basis of a concept which, though real, does not represent the whole intelligible content of the physical entity, but a

part only."l A forma.lity, whIle it 1s not a d1stinct physical
thIng, is a positive something somehow less thM. a. thing, the
rq.t~o gR.leej.~vi

of a distInct formal concept, its objective baais

It has lts own quldd,ltyor entity_

The formality exists by the

existence of the thine, and. even God ca.nnot separate the formality from the existenoe of the thing.

Just as there is a real

distinction between the "lhole a.nd. its parte, eo there is a formal

distinotion betttteen the thing as a. whole and. the single formalities.

This formal distinotion is 1nt\dequate, s1noe. in the d1$-
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t1notion bei''Il'een "a.n1mallty" and "sensitivity", tte.n1mality" in...

eludes "eens1tiv1ty".

However, there is a modal distinction be-

tween a formality and its intrinsi c mode, as for example t between
intelligence and its mode ot finiteness in man. 2

Aooording to the investigat10ns ot

}~ur1ce

GraJewskl,

O.F.M., 1nto the lorma.l distinction of" Duns Scotus, a formality
ia "a posit1ve entity 'klhlch, antecedently to the operation of' the

intelleot, is inseparably and. really conjoined with the being or
essenoe lllth1n which it is tound.. I

*,

Correspondingly, a formal

d1stinotion is "s. distinction from the nature of the thing ocoUl."'ing between two or more really identical formalities, of which
one, before the operation of the intellect, 1s conceiva.ble with-

out the others though inseparable trom them even by dl vine pow....
er."4

Th.• tonnal distinotion is a sS!$uJ.pdYnl ~ or restricted

real distinction 1n tha.t the things distinguished do not have a.
Simple 1dent1 ty f but only a !}!suw.4:wn
~

g]l~

non-ldent.i ty.

A §ICW'"

9Ji!1s1 distinction exists when, the identity inta.ot, there ex-

iste a diversity in these tllree cond1tlons:5

trom the nature of

2 IJ?W;., 22-24.
.at .PJmI.

3 Mttur1ce J. GraJewski,. O.F.M_ 1 lllS!. F,g;rmp.J, Distinction
S90!rJUh Washington, D.C. t 1944, 7th
It

XXII, 403.

~.t

9'.

5 sootus; R§PQJ:1.MP: ilPatbS1f.mS13J I, d. ,,; q. 2, n. 10

the th1:n.g, lJefore the operation of t.he intellect, on. formality
is oonceivable \'lithout. the others. t}1..ough meta.physioa.11Y' 1nsepe.-

ro.ble.

Pal'-thenius MinGes, O.F.M., states that eaoh individual
being contains two fo:rmalitles, the common qulddltatlve nature

and its indIviduality or haeoceltY'_

These realitIes in essence

and in oonoept can be corw1dered by themselves, but the one is

no way the other, even though they are metaphysically united so
010se1y that even the PO,,,.3l' of God cannot separate them .. 6 Minge

uses this statement from the oourse Seotus taught at

~AtOrd

to

prove his point,

6 Farthenius Vdnges, O.F.J.l •• ~ At:a12J:.gllt iDeallY'
RsaltamY'! £.tJl Duntl 6QgW~;, Munater, 1908~41: is 1st auoh wahr,
dass moh 8CotU8 jedes Individuum aua zllel Entitaten oder Realltaten und somi t aua zwel Elnhe! ten besteht t niimlioh aua det" quiditntiven oder der al1gemelnen Natur, una aus dar individuellen.
l<la.g auah in der 1'llrk11ohkei t ein Jedes Ding noah so sebr eines
sain una zwer derart, dass faktisoh weder die allgemeIne Ne.tur
ohne IndIVidUation nooh die Indiv1duation ohne allgemeine Natur
bestaht, Ja., ~11e wlr sehan werden, nioht einmal bestehen ka.nn,

so kamen daran doch mehrere Reali taten unterachleden 11erden, vo
denen die Gine nicht dle andere 1st. D1e allgeme1ne Natur 1st
al:nmal tonnell, d..h. 1hrem Besrltt und Wesen Moh, nioht IdentIeoh mit der IndIvIduation oder Realitat des Einzelnen, nooh umgeltehrt.. Bald.. verh&lten s1ch fAwar nloht zu einander wie versoh1$dene l)lnge oder tic.ahen, aber doch wie zwei Realitaten oder
reale Teile ein und dareelOOn Sache. Genus utld Spezles eines
DInges sInd. nioht slne andere Sache ala dae Ind.I vidualle desae!ben Dinges, wahl abel' sind sieRealitaten ein und desaelben
Dinges. die formell VOn e1na.nder vel'soh1ed.en sind. See a.lso
Parthan1us lUnges. O.F.)§.. '" "Duns Sootus, tf lll!. C§.M,bg~Q SYSl2-

Wil, New York, 1909,

v,

196 ..
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Quodlibet eommune at taman determlnabl1e adhuo poteat d1st1ngul, qua.ntumque ai t una. res f ln plures rea11 tates forma11ter d1stinotns. quarum haec formal1ter non eat 111a.
Sed haec est formal1ter entltae slngular1s, at ilia est anti tas naturae forma.l! tar, nee p01.3Sunt 1stae duae reall tates
esse res at res, siout possunt esse real1tas, unde accipitur
genus. at real! tas, unde acOipl tur differentia, ex qul bus
realitaa·apecltloa acalpltur. !l)ed semper in eodem, slTe
parte slve toto, sunt real1tates ejusdem rei f'orma11ter distlnetae.7
Anything oommon and yet determinable, in sO far a.s

it

1s a singular thins, can be divided into severa.l rea11t.ies for-

ma.lly dist1nct, of which one is not formally the other.

The one

1s formally the singula.r ent1ty, and the other 1s formally the
entity of the nature.

These two realities cannot be taken as

thing and thing, as the reality from wh1ch genus is taken. and

the reality from 'lhich difference 18 taken, malt1ng the reality
The singular entity a.nd the entity of nature are
realities of the same th1ng formally d1st1nct. 8
spec1:f'lc.

1'0 the

RRrtAlA

oontrp~J,

Pgr~§ten§~a

(}rajewski pOints out that in the Re-

Scotus names six formalities that constitute

"eaCh compos1te having unitive 1dentity," namely, "universal and
ind.1 vidual ma.t tar t un! versa;l and 1ndi vid.ual form. the un.1 versal
and 1ndividua.l compoa1te. tf9

8

rue

seems to be a more specific

~.

9 Grajewskl t

:at. lRral

D1,1fiJ.lgti21h 95.

r
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division ot"'the general division Minges makes ot ea.ch lndlV'ldual
being into the common na. ture a.nd 1 ts 1001viduali 1:.y_

Duns Sootus places a forma.l distinction between the
nMuro.

S!gmm~ih

to use his 'Words, and individuallty_

To better

understand this distinction it is neoessary to examine nootus's
position on the doctrine of th((t universals which is closely con....
neoted 'With the M!tu.r.A QgPlmYms, and his position on the doctrine

of "haecceity", or the principle of indivlduat.lon. 10
Scotus says that the universal is trom the intellect.
It is not a. figment. because nothing in reality outside the mind
corresponds to a figment.

To the un!versal there oorresponds

SOIl'l$thing outside the mind, by whioh the intelleot 1s moved to

cause an intention of this sort.

Therefore, the universal 1s

from the intellect effectively, but ma.terially or genetioally or
oocasionally the universal proceeds from a property 1n the
thlng. ll

Duns Soatus dlstlnf.,'·uishes betlleen two types at univer-

sals.

The subjeotive universa,l is a produot of the mInd, a

seoond intention, the formal
purely mental construct.

~~Q

of the thing oonsidered as a

The objeotive universal 1s the absolute

quiddity of the thing. atlrat intention, the na.ture oonsidered
10

It 97.

.taa.,

140 •

11 Scotus, §YPfr

Yn.ler§al~1 fOr;ph'tQ:= •• f

q. 4, n.

4,
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as nature," and the object of the second. intention.

quIddIty is

~Al

The a.bsolute

neither singulBr nor universal but indif-

'.rh1s obJeotive universal as such is the object of' the
lntellect. 12
ferent.

"The universal 1s sometimes taken for a. second intention
whioh follows the first operation of the intelleot by Which
a. quIddIty 1s understood. absolutely • • .. at other tim..s,
however, the universal 1s taken for the thIng subject to t
second intentIon. 1.e., for the absolute qu1ddity of the
thins ,,,hloh 1s of itself neither universal nol" singular, bu
ind.ifferent. Such is the d1reotobject of' the intellect
which is not in the intelleot subjectively but only objectively."l,
"

MInges oalls these universals the universal

~

ftlienAP or the

metapbjrs1cal universal. and the universal in predioation or the
logical universal"l4The a.ctual un! versal exists only in the intellect, but
the potential universal, the same as the specifio nature of

thinss, exists only in thinge. 15 The potential universal posses·
ses a speoifio Unity.lo
t

tr:t.Imt

This unity 1s not merely subjective.

J

lamA.

12

GraJewskl, ~

D3,ft:!t~n9t121h

13

scotue, R!. .\t:WnA, q. 11, n. 14, Ill, 581.

142.

1914.

14 Parthen1us Minges, O.F.M., ~~~~ ~ ~Ml0til9PblcA & T.b!gj.9EJ.I&h Quare.ec~ , I, ~

15 scotus. H$t'l2QaA.t'-llIt~I"mltil3:I' II, d .• 2, q. 5,
n. 12, XXIII. 31. <h'aJewe· , Ill!. lomftl D~st,=;p.ctc1-ml' 142 ..

16 .14$1., d. 12, q. 5, n. 11, XXIII, 30. .ll?JJl.t 14.3.

L
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bUt, because of its real existenoe, tl1..1s unity 1s objective.

It.

1s not 10g1cal nor numerical, and though 1t 1s less than a numerioal unity. it 1s a real unity.IT We understand the nature

0

the potential un1ve.raal b7 understanding the o.octr1ne of the

DAEWa Sl9l!llYn3.s.
In the world outside the mind. only individ.uals exist
actually"

Scotue follows Av1cenna. in saying that the compo.sl t9

indiv1dua1 ohares a common ot' universal !"'..a.ture, whioh in reality
is not common, nor universal, nor partioular, but 1ndifferent, a

nature only.18

The common nature is the same as the unlversaJ. 1

the th1ng, the 8po011'10 nature 1n the thing,

Yn~ver&U!rJ:it

in m,.

and differs from the universal in the intelleot, the second intention, the 1mb vet§IJa! 1n In:lfeJ,;t!ot16.

The common nature exists

in the indiVidua.l in so far as it 1s conoeived as common 'by the

lntt)ll,eot. but it does not exist 1n the individual as a. common
nature.

If the oommon nature did ex1st in the individual a8 a.

common nat.ure, Uthen 'tfe ",ould be foroed to a.dm1 t the exie'tence 0

Platonic idea.s or the really existent un1versals."19
17 i'bld., n. 12, XXIII, '1.

'W.

18 3cotus.
n. 8, VII, 458.

'!'he oommon

~.

1n lie tPJ2hy§;LSlm £1 stotc!l3.§, VII, q. 18,

r
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,

nature is not a simple lasieal beinG, since it 1s not a pure tiS
ment of the mind..

If the oommon nature

"~jere

a pure fl£5tllsnt of'

the mind, "vrs vfould knOl1' nothing about reality, but only about
our concepts, and our opinion would not ohange from the true to

the false with the ohange in the existence of e. thing.MOO
The universa.l or common nature can exist only in individuals.

The oommon nature 113 indifferent to the aotual existence or non-exlstenee of thlnga. 21 The oommon nature in itself,
however, is non-existent, but exists in the individual whioh represents it. 22 TIle universal as an actual or logical universal
oannot exist as a being, since to

be

existing as exist1ng 1s c

trad1etary to the notion of too universal In rw1tlhthat ls, t.he
purely menta.l oonatruet. 23 Therefore the existence of the com-

mon or un1 versa.l nature 113 more aingulv.r than un! versa.l, sinoe
it is not universal unlaoe in the s1ngular. 24 The intrins1c rePT.

20 scotu8, 1n ~~tQ!bi§~~~f!O~tft VII,.q. 18,
n. 10, VII. 459. GraJews i, . e _~____ .§t_ _ _ Dn. 144.
XII, 278.

21

Scotus,

~

O;;S2NenfUh II, d. "

22

Scotu0,

~

Oxoni§Q§s, I, d. 3. q. 6, n. 8, IX,

lbi~.

1l:l1$1.

q. 11. n. 11,

XX, 41.

24 Scotus, l.n HPtil2h ;vs1.SUYD A9:at~tre~3.~, VII, q. 13,
n. 23, VII, 424: Quod cum extra. sensum d a:n. (scilicet universalla), 1mma.nlfestum est utrum aunt, vel non. RespOi1deo, hoc

r
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I

i

I

latlon bet\1een the individuality and the common nature is so in"
tlmate that with the oorruption of the individual or compos1te
goea the destruotion of the universal no.ture conta.ined l11thln
i1'.. 2 5

God restores the common nature by oreating new individual

with this rmture,20 or by producing anew this same speoies 1n

another Individual. 21
The rP2Q~i§ aR!9~§~s§~, or prerogative speCies, is

t'the common nature of a. thing "Thlah in 1 teelf is neither singu....
lar nor univarsal--lt 1s the nature as natura; that is \"lhs;t the

natural causee in the process of knowing f1rst produoe 1n our
intellect., "28
Singulars and individuals are the only really existing
th1ngs.

These are beings, and not "be1ng as such", and as belng

they are known 1ntu1ti vely.
I

The!Ul.i. gommwa&Ul1mm or tfbeing as

.

sst de oogn1tlone 81 est, sive rei in propria. exlstentiae, sic
etle.m de universa11 est imman1festum, nisi sciatur necessarium
1n aliquo singularl; quia. tamen taUs exlstentla est magis sIn..
gular1s quam universa11s. quia non est universa11s nis1 in singular!, 1deo s1c singular1a mag1s dicuntur non scibilia. quia
ta11s cognit10 magis compet1t e1s. ~.

25

'b~s1.

26

Bantus, RttP2rtltA Parll*!ps1fh II. d. "

n. 5. XX. 581.

~.,

Xb1~.

27 Scotus..2WA

16!. 'b'~.

145.

O"'2n1~nwih

q. 1,

II, d. :; t q. 1, n. 4, XII t
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suoh" 1s the most general ooncept drawn from and prescinding from
lndi vidual be1ngs with their formalities of oommon natUN and
haecce1 ty. and from the intrinsic modes of fin! ty and lnflni ty.
tfBelns as such" is not

a. reality, but only

a predioate, though

much broader in predioation than any universal, being oalled
t:r(;)·naoendental for this reason.

&

Since it 1s a pred.loa.te and no

reality, it cannot beoome the object of intuitive knowledge.
Thus, the t.W!.

C~il4mvm

tal as posaible. 29

is a concept that is as transcenden-

Intuitive knowledge on the part of the intel-

lect bas tlle individual being as its objeot.

We will now look into the rela.tion of the common nature
to tht".t individual, their distinction, and the part played by the
individual properties in relation to the oommon nature.

In hie

doctr1ne on the w'l1'Versals a.nd. the common nature Sootus differs
slightly or only apparently 'with the traditional sohool.

In his

dootrine on the prinoiple of indiv1duation and "haeecelty" Sootus
differs radically with the trad1t1onal school.3D
T~

common nature in the quiddity of things is the

as their generic and speoific natures.

S8.tlle

These natures do not ex-

29 Cyril L. Shiroel, O.F.M •• "Abstraotiye and Intuiti," Knowledge in Relation to Being.• " fl:O!~!§a.llfl Sl.t. .th!. Amera,sum
CtJtbQUg illtlsi2pha.211

A'Hi2e~a.t19nt
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I

bauet IntegfallF the oomplete nature of the indIvidual similar to
the way that the genus does not exh&ust the specIes.,l There 113
in the IndIvidual an IndivIdual property that perfects the complete nature of the IndivIdual.

In the IndIvidual there are two

entities or I'ealitles or forma.lities formally distInct: the unI-

!h, universal forma.l!

vet'sal and. the particular.

gomm1Wl~h

man element, the essenoe, the ;Qett,uti

everr individual liithin the same species.

ty 1s the oom-

which is oommon to

The part1cular for-

mali ty is the Ind! v1duali ty t the haeooel ty. or sln[,'Ular antI ty f

whioh oonstitutes the indivIdual as

auo~.32

Duns Seotue tells

us that the intention of nature 1s fulfilled in the apeoles. as
if in something more perfect than the

g~mu3,

sr..d It 1 s fulfilled

in the indIvidual, in a more perfect and a more real entIty than
the entity of the speolss.33

T11ia gives the Ind1vidual more per-

feotion and a ne"1 posit1on 1n the domain of metaphysIcs and scl-

ence.""
_

st. Thomas, however, says that the ultllJ1.ate

tendency in

r

144,

In

lDt~iPFwa!SAlll
~

31

:Jaotus,

,2

SootU8, ~ft

n. 13_ VII, 413.
~.

Grajewmti.

34

Baotus,

Dl§~lnot.so.

145_

QcPnbOn@l, II, d. " q. 6, n. 15t XII.

33 Dcotus, ~RO~I
457. 'P~Q •• 1 •

n. 25. XXIX,

Ar!atotf;Q1§, VII, q. 13.

Fermfl

lDr~i.fnft1it

1n H!;t.A]2h;:l:slPBm

I, d. 36, q. 4,

AQatotd!Jr3.1h VII. q.

1,.

n. 17, VII. 417: Ind1v1duum est verlss1me ena at unum •••
Longpre. "The Psyohology 01' Duns Scotus and. Its Modern! ty , t1 63.
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nature is to1lard the species, and not toward the indivldual nor
the genus.3S The individual finds 1ts place with the universal
as the objeot of the 1ntellect and of knowledge 1n the individual
'be1ng of Duns Scotus.
The ind1vidual ent1ty tram which is taken the indivIdual differenoe is not the matter, nor the form, nor the composite.

It is the ultimate reality of being of the matter, the

form, and the oomposite.

Duns 3eotus tells us that every qu1ddI-

tatlve entity, whether the part of 80me genus or the Whole genus,
ls of itself indlfferent, as a quldditat1ve entity, to thIs or
thatentity.

Oonsequently, as a quidditatlve entity 1s naturally

prior to thatent1ty as it is j;hi§, and &s it is prior naturally,
just as it does not correspond to it to be

~,

formal nature its opposite--to be

not contradictory to

it.

~--is

so from I1',s own

The composite in so far as it is e. nature does not include

its own entity by which it 1s

~,

nor does matter In so far as

it is a na.ture include its entit.y by which it is this ma.tt.er, nor
does form include its own entity in so far as form 1s a nature.

Therefore, this entity is not ma.tter, torm, or the composite, in
so far as any of these is a nature, but 1t is the ultimate reality ot the being that 1s matter. or tha.t 1s form, or that 1s the

II, 821.

35 st. Thomas Aquinas,

~.

1-, I, q. 85, a. 3, ad 4,
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oomposite.:56

Since ma.tter, form, and the composite can all be

-

conceived as un1versal, they oannot be the principle of indivi ....
duality a.s such.

Duns Scotus distingu1shes b$tween the nature 01'

ma.tter and 1ts individual1ty as "this matter," tha.t is, between
the common nature and' the haeooeitY".'7
~he

indiv1dua1, as

S\lch,

exists beoause of something

positive that makes 1t exaot1y what it 1s and nothing else.

This

posit1ve entity is the "YJ.tl¥ £!A;U:NI§ en!ris" ,,8 or the '*:b!.tAoe1tea»".'9
The formality that makes up the 1ndividual is not mat-

ter, since the same singularity found in the oorrupted being 1s
not found. 1n the generated be1ng,40 nor is it quantified matter,

since a change in the quantity of an object does not mean a
change in its lndlvidua1ity,41 nor is it an aocident, since accidents presuppose something prior in nature Which 1s substance,

XII, 144.

XII, 144.

36

'7,8

Gra.jeweki, Th!

scotus t

~

EPtma.

D~stlncN~2n,

2ognl@n§8, II, d. "

'9 Scotus, Reportata Parisians18"
n. 1, XXIII I 25. ,1;44 •• n. 14, XXIII, '2.
40

XII, 124., 125.

146, 147.
q. 6, n. 15,

II, d. 12, Q.. 5,

ScotU8, Q:ma. Oe;£mlen&e, II, d. 3, q. 5, n. "
Grajewsk1, Ibi. Fo~ Dl§'k.n<tt12P, lSO.

41 Gra.jewsltl, Si!9~miJ. R1mtr1sctlon, 150. Sharp,
Fra.M,aSAn MJ.o@opGx a1 0 .. . 111 ~ IhJ,1:;t.een14b C!mm:y, 303.
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and for thi~ reason oannot individuate the 8ubstance. 42

Exist-

ence is not the ca.use of indiv1duation. because what is not d1stinct of 1tself ca.nnot distingu1sh another.

Existenoe 1s deter-

m1ned to dIfferent genera and species by the determination of essences of which it is the existenoe.

If existenoe were not so

determined by esaences, existenoe would have proper genera. species and d1fferences besides the determination of its essence. 43
The composite does not cause individuation. that iS t materia.l
substances are not individuated

~~,

so

tl~t

what giv$S them

realIty gives them a.lso individuality, as the Nominalists say_
Sootus believes that the nature of itself is indIfferent to singularIty and to unIversality_

-rhe nature beoomes singular by

contraction by the thisness ot the thing, and It beoomes universal by means ot the Intellect.A4 Sharp tells us that "if a
na.ture !A

.u 1s a

~,

the intelleot J when underste.nding 1 t as

a universal, underatands it under a oharaoter opposed to its
nature, just as it 1t were to understand Soorates as a un1verThe Nominalists' theoI7 tbat the nature of itself is a

89.1"45
•

•

II

42

Grajewsk1, lJJA F9£!llAl; P.,1st1ngt1on. 149.

43 Sootus, In f''ktliby,1 gy Arl?!:!io!r!U~, VII, q.
n. 7, VII f 1408. Grajewsk, ~ 19nnal R&liGwf4wt, 149.
44 Grajevlskl,

Sharp, F.rtmgl§g~ PhlJ.9P0'Qhy.
Qanteurl, 299 II

45

.%h~rte@n~b

~ E2mpl; p~!!~lngt1on,

n

141.

OxfotS lnlbJt
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~

means "ha.t the nature 13.!. .!!. It.Y.S!. becomes the entire sub-

stance of diverse individuals, thus identifying the species with
the whole nature of the individual. 46
Oonsequently, the entity that makes up the individual
i8 the

u~k~ relli~I'

oomposite,

ent&1 of matter, and of form, and of the

"The individual is., therefore, not made up merely ot

matter and form, but ot

~

matter and

~

form, forming

~

oompoSite or individua,1."47 Haecoeity adds nothing to the qualitative determinations of the 1ndiv1dual and 1s 1n no sense a univeraal. 48

The ha.eooeity 1s the element that "oontracts and oom-

pletes the speoifio torm by impressing upon 1t 1ts defin1tive
se&1."49

It is the ultimate reality ot being, oontraoting the

speoies, to make it one in number, incommunioable, and ex1sting
by itself, or subsistent.50
In every oreated thing a d1stinotion is made between

the oommon nature, oorresponding to the senus and the speoies,

and the individual property or ha.eoceity, as humanity and Soora-

46 IM4.
47 Grajewskl, Ib!. f9rmil !2~I~"nslflon, 152.

48 Sootus, Repp£i~& Ppr111eplla, II, d. 12, q. 5,
n. 12, XXIII, ,1. GraJewski, The F2rml.l n,=,t1n2t19D, 152.
49 Gra3ewskl, 1bI. lQrJDldw

D" stinQ1t1on,

152.

SO Scotus. 8t~p'1tt.~I""' II, d. 12, q. 8,
n. 3, XXIII, '7. GraJew~~ ~ ~
D~sitnct12p. 152.
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t101ty_

Tne oommon nature 1s universal, but not purely

8.

10gio&

universal. nor a figment of the mind, but a nature as nature, indifferent to universality a.nd singularity.51 The COmmon nature
1s also a metaphysioal universal_

Consequently, both 10g1cal

be1ng and metaphysical being are the object of the intellect.

ina

j.!lgxUUl'~Um

.!nJ! in both orde.rs is the objeot of the intelleot.

Thus being 1s understood in two ways: as restrioted to the real

order of things and of the ooncepts of first intentions, or as
taken in the widest pOBsible oonnotation that embraoes both the
real and the logical orders.

It is in this latter sense that

being is the object of the intelleot.

fI~ngUN!t-wn"

W. 3dlQuAnt«l.g! !llI. bas a. dual interpreta.tion.

in the phrase

Metaphysioal tmJ.

im U rAP1iYm lIm. is understood speolfloatively, or in so far as
lngYilltsWU specifies being to 1 ts proper and formal notion, that
1s,

w. 1ngygn3;.y; JmI. in reference

tt.il 'helUS-

to the object of

the intellect 1s understood redup110atively, not specified to the
formal a.nd proper notion of' 'be1ng .P.tU!
also a ft§KW;&'lt:um

.~

a,

but

formal notion ot being.

as that whioh is
In this reduplloa.-

tive sense logioal being 1s considered as contained v1rtually 1n

real being which

~ ml

enjoys this formal notion of being. 52

In this senae logical and real being is the object of the 1ntel-

r"1QY Arj.a!tp1'eells.

51 ScotU!!, 1a Htl:8J2
n. 10, VII, 459. ~•• 152, 53.

52 acotus,

9gmmen~~Ym

VII, d. 18,

In 9Y!es#12n!1 Quod.1R!tAles,
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lect.
There is a formal diatinotion between the common nature
and the haeoe.ity,53 since they both are formalities.54

These

two formalities possess all the necesaary oharaoteristios of the
formal dist1nction.

The common nature exists actually a

£@i. before the operation of th~ intellect.55

patym

The common nature

1s not separated nor can be separated from the indiVidual or s1n
gular even by the power of God.56

Since these two realities can

not be included in the aame concept, although they are separable,
the positive reality. haecceity, 1s formally distinct from the

nii)!J:f;l;

QSUlYDlm.sa or the specific nature.57

Beoause these two

real! ties oar.not be included in the same concept, their definitiona muetbe different,.58

q. "

4-7.

00.

xxv,

117-119.

With the corruption of the Ind1vldua
Shiroe!, I~ Up.iy;poll:z ru:.1fD.!..£Q.nat i2lm Pil 5soliMI t 103.

.w. ~ b~1Jr£S 111 W. MJr91Uh i

5' Bootus, In B!d~Ii:§.gf!m ~f~ot~tf' IV, q.. 2,
n. 24, VII, 171. GraJewski, .e lomai RlitIlliitlsu. 153.
1,2.

54 seotus,

~.

XII, 7-10.

x, 554.

~ QeQ~ftU81.

II, d. 3. q. 6, n. 9, XII;

55 Seatue • .2m:lA Qe2n2,eDlSh II, d. "
~.

56

.:t>.f3.

SOOtU8,.2:m:1.i QcOpJ.raHM;), It d.

q. 1, nn. 2-5,

3S, q. un10a., n. 12,

57 soatue, lD. i!j(IRUlstQY Al:taltg!tft11s, VII, q. 1"
.
n. 15. VII, 414. 415. ~.
58 GraJewskl. Ill!. Egrmal P1Bt1nslt1.Qn, 153.
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follows tho"destruct1on of the universal or oommon nature.

This

destruction 1s similar to the destruotion of any other formality
that inheres 1n a subjeot and undergoes oorruption.59
The principle of individuation of Duns Scotue beoomes
intel11gib1e t[1.rough the applica.tion of the formal distinction;
and 1s e10sely connected with

~he

formal distinction.

seotue's

teaching on the individual be1ng and the formal d1stinction

brines out the richness of the indiVidual.

Today stress is la1d.

on the un1versal as the medium of aclenoe. 60
The common nature really existing in things 1s thE) ob-

ject1ve basie for our universals, preventing their being fictions
of the mind: «c'est qu'11 exlste, pcur ehaque ur0.verael. un substrat qui soit ree1lement ldent1que 8. eat universel. tt6l ttor ,
b1en que cet intelligible en acte soit un objet 1ntellig1ble singul1er, cleat

determ1n$e t

,

deja

l'universal a.u sens de fnature commune at In-

done universa11sable."62

Thus, the being of Duns

$cotUEI io conta1ned within each individual, as the common and.
undeterm1ned

11.1:l ture

of Avlcenna, and. 1n a senae, of Plotinus.

59 1,W..
60

l123.g •• 15:3, 154.

61 Etienne Gilson, "Les Se1ze Premiers Theoremata at.
X, Pensee d.e Duns Soot, n
d tHts1e o br! POgtrinfi!,J,e !l. ~
l4'~ ~ MSI@n A/!&., Xl, 9 .. 93'S". 25.

ApMl!1

62

l,W., 16.
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How then'can this position avoid nominalism: how can we
obviate making of our universal ideas mere words, a tlltu§ Y9gi',
the sound of air, with no obJeotive basis or true signification?
The answer is to be found in leaving what is singular 1n the
f1rst obJec\ of thought, and 1n understand1ng the natHrl of the
object.

To do this we must

se~k

for the principle of individua-

tion. not in matter, nor in matter

gYlnt~~I~ '~6nfiQJ

intrinsio formality of the object known as hascoeity.
oiple 1ndiv1dualizes the 8ingular.
object of the 1ntelligenoe.

but In the
Th1s prin-

The singular is the nrst

However. the s1ngular 1s known In-

dist1notly, and it beoome8 known d1st1nctly when the intellect,
after having elaborated these pr1nciples of the oommon nature and
the haeco.ity, applies them to the singular.

Consequently, the

indistinct s1ngular 1s what we come to know at f1rst, but if
there 1s question of dIst1not Intelleotlon, 1t is not the singu.
lar, but the un1versal wh10h is known ln the first plaoe. 63
This primary objeot of thought 1s a complex object.
Beoause it 1s complex, the intelleot has the r1ght to make a dls
tlnction, considering one part as the object, wh1le preec1ndlng
from the other.
then the

"nature~

wbat 1 t grasps for consideration separately is
that 1s to say. "the common and 1ndeterminate

nature" of Avlcenna.

This 1s a basic part of scotlatl0 thought.

79
Taken in

it~lf,

1ts str1ct senae.

the nature 1s nothing else than the essenCe 1n
Oonsidering 1t 1nasmuch as it is a universal,

predioable of many, is the business of the logioian.

Cons1der-

ing 1t in so far as it 1s singular, individualized by its haecoeity, in its ultimate complet1ve form; 1s the business of the
natural ph1losopher, or the physioist.

However, in its indeter-

m1nation itself, as being itself, neither universal, nor s1ngu·
lar, auch is in a word the consideration of the

~etaphyslcian.

The nature of the horse, "equinityll, is ne1ther that which makes
this nature oapable of being pred1ca.ted. of several individuals,
nor that which makes it the .ih1I. 01' a.
1t is the nature of the horse.

~artloular

indivldual, but

Scotus la fond. of the phrase Av!

cenna uses: "equln1 ty 1 s nothing more than equint

t,..

tt64

Oonsequently. to fortity our concepts with an obJeot1'f1

basis Sootus sees the necessity for seeing in the individual
thing a common nature, formally dlstinct from the individuating
difference or haeooeity.

This common nature plays the role of

the foundation in rea11ty for the universal
modifies the Aristotelian motto,

con~ept.

Scotus

*R~ill!9~1 ~~Q~Iftr§&~.um,

tUm~l:U! ;'llt'5Y*grlYl. 65 As a Christian meta.physician looking tor-

64

~.,

1,_ 14.

65 Aristotle.

cr.

24-28.

lllxs1~H!t It

5, 189&,5. llla.. worl§ !2L

A£1;\P\k', ad. Wm. Dav1d Rose, Oxford, 1908-1931, II.
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ward to the1beatitic vision ot God tace to taoe,66 h~ qualities
it substa.ntially to read: lnhJrJ,eglty!

W.

Ymnts{}J,1um Jl. 1?1nsy-

JafUC!.Wllt "!lUlIul l2ansMJ,t:rlum ltNl1;Ylh 67 The 1ntellect oan know the
universal and. the singular, wh1le the aenses are reetrioted. to
knowledge of the singula.r alone.

Singularity as singularity is

not intel11gible to our

in its present state, as un1-

ted to the body-

1ntell~ct

Singularity is intelligible as such to the in-

tellect taken as a faculty separate from the body J and will be
known by our intellect at the beatific vision.

Know1ng s1ngular

natures in this life, and knowing that they are singular, is no

guarantee to our percel vins the exact formal rea.son why they are
singula.rs.

Thus our clear and distinct oonoepts, doflning the

eseence of reality, are partial and inoomplete conoepts, s1nce
they exclude the concrete indiVidual in its .full intelligibilitY'
!hese concepte and det1nitions represent the common elements
only--those

Eit~2;!'

other 1ndividuals.

held in common actually or possibly with
Sootus postulates the

DA~i

29mmYP'. to pro

tect the objectivity ot these notions. the definltions at the
root of all soientifio knowledge.

The

D!tH£~

ggmmYA4S is for-
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mally distinct from its principle of indiv1duation, "endowed wi
its own proper un1ty, whloh 1s somehow less than numerioal
unity, ••

~

(and) as aotualized in concrete lndividual th1ngs,

forms the immed1a.te and proper object of the oonceptus realls."6
i'he Scotlst1c concept of the ina1 vidual be1ng, mooe up

of the common nature and the individual dlfference of haeoceltYf
both formally distinct, 1s the object of the intellect and its
dual prooess of knowledg$: abstraction and intuition.

Abstrac-

ti ve knowledge reaches as far as the essence or oommon nAture.

the ideal quiddity_

Intuit1ve knowledge completes the proces&

by reachlng the first 1ntentions of being, the ex1stentlal presenoe shin1ng through

tl~

ind1vidual difference.

In abstraction

the intelllgible specles motivates the lntelleot, but the th1ng
present in itself is the motivating object in intu1tive know.
ledge.

Only by plaoing e. formal distinction between the common

nature and the 1001vidua11 t1 to produce the really 1d.entica.l 1n-dlvidual belUt".!;, oan the individual being be the ObJeot of the
dual process of the 1ntelleot t s aot of understandins: the a.bstra.ct1ve a.nd the 1ntuitive.
'rhe intuitive knowledge of an a.ctua.lly ex1sting and

-,------,

-.

r

82

present ObJeot has a structure built upon the synthesis of the
univoclty of the concept ot belng--there is an analogy among
ua;t.;Lx existing belngs--from the forma11 ties of the common nature

and the individuating difference or haecceity, both formally dis-

tinct.

Here is the contInuity of formal d1st1nct1on or real ide

tity to be found 1n univocal

~ing.

To be understood is the

to~

mal distinct10n or real identity exist1ng between the sensitive
and intellectual powers ot the soul, though not between their
operations, giving them their continuity.

The link ot intuitive

knowledse seems to supply the continuity between univocal being
and unified soul.

We come now to the tormal distinction as it applies to
the sensitive and intellective powers of the soul, serving as the

basis for intuitive knowledge.
Seotue bases his strongest argument in tavor of a tormal d1stinction between the sensitive and intellective powers of
the soul on the principle of oontro.dlotlon.

Before the operatio

of the intellect oontradiotories are predioated of antmality and
rationa11ty 1n man.

Sinoe these oontradictories cannot poss1bly

belong to one and the same 1nd1stinct subject, these oontradictories must be formally distinct.

Contradiotories are predIcated

of animality and rationality in man before the operation of the
intellect, beoause the principle of similarity with brutes belongs to animality in man, but rationality laoks this agreement.

r

..

The prinoiple of agreement and the prlnciple of dlsagreement are
contra.diotory predloates.

These oontradiotory predicates. how-

"

,

I

ever, inhere in one subjeot, the soul.

Therefore rationality and

a.nimality are formally dlstinot. 69
Before the operation of the intellect takes plaoe in
ma.n there pre-exlst the formalities of animality and ra.tlonality,
slnce "animal1ty in man is the sentient princ1ple and. the source

ot all sensitive powers, while rationality is not. otherw1se ther
would b& a two-told a.dequate cause in man for the same effects,"

and since lIanima11ty has a. true aptitud& to be communioated to
many beings speoifica.lly distinct, whioh is not proper to rat1onality_ n10

Th1s may sound like formalism, but we should remember

that "form" and "formality" do not mea.n the same thing.

"Form is

really distinot trom 1ts subjeot, while formality is really identioal ,.,1th its subjeot.

Different formsbEl'spau- a d1versity ot

beings; different formalities do not imply a plurality Of beings
but simply a plurality ot realities within a singltS ent1ty. Jt 71

Formality is not a thins. it is a. !:!A 1"$1. 72

On this score, w1th

the forma.lity a reality of the th1ng, and with the formal d.is-

19'.

69 Sootus, ~ 0Ef~I~ft II, d.. 1, q. 5. n. 5, XI,
Gra.1ewsk1, Th§ FormAl
jit19Ih 97.
70

lla.a71
••

~.

Bcotus,
74.

72 1W..

lW.., 97. 98.
~
~.

2I2mr'U§!, IV.

d.

46, q. :;, n. 5, xx,

tinction a division of the real dist1nction, perhaps the accusa.tion of exa.ggerated realism is also an alleged one.
The second

class of arguments in favor of the formal

distinction, say between animality and rationality, is based on
the terms of the di stinotion.

There are many entities really

identIcal which have different. defin1tions.

Sinoe a definition

expresses the nature of the thing as it exista A pgt! mor in
reality and not as it 1s found in our concepts, a differenoe in
definitions 1ndicates a formal distinctlon between really identified entities.

Referenoe 1s here made to definitions that ex-

press the nature or the formal and qUidd1tat1ve eSI' of the entity. the nature that the entity has prior to the operation of th
intellect. that ls, IA DitslD r!i.. and not to a.ooidental or d ......
criptive defln1tions.13
With the logical distinction inSUfficient to .xplain
how oontradiotories are united with1n 8.. single ent1ty,74 and with
the real distinction considered as too broad and drastiC, Duns
sootus proposes the formal distinotion between the soul and ita
faculties and between the faoult1es.75

73 5cotus,
99.

Ibi~.f

74

p~§ OJO~IDII.

.

I, d. 8, q. 4, n. 18, IX,

GraJewski f %hi. FgmAl D.,t,ngj;isw, 98.

75 il?"s;\. t 169.
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In reality

the soul is identical with its powers.

When

we consider the powers of the soul formally or quidditatively according to the strict notion or formal reason of the powers, they
are not identical with the soul, nor among themselves.
era of the soul can

be

The pow-

:i]

considered as different entities, reali-

ties or formalities of the sam. subject. that is to say, they are
unitively contained within the essenee of the soul.

In this sense

the powers ot the soul are really identical but formally distinot.16
In speak1ng of the identity of the sensitive and intellectual powers of the soul among themselves and. with the soul,
Scotus presents some subtle metaphysical cons1derations about
un! ty and the "Sulntel:nllUcia y,a,2.i1xl-"

Ent! ties completely 1den-

tioal are not unitlvel1 contained, because they are not united.
Beings that have the same distinction between themselves that they
had previous to the union are not unitively contalned.

Entltles,

however, that are really identioal but formally distlnct are unitlvel,. oontalned.
ways.

'rbese.entlt1es are Un1tlvely contained in two

In the first way the entltlee ,are of tlfe na.tnre of the con-

tainer, ·as entities superior to the container, as for example the
formal

~~R

of whlteness, color, sensible quality and quality is

reoelved by the same

76

-

~.

subJec~,

and all theAe formal reasons are

II.i.
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aupel;'ior to'" this \1hl.tenes$ al"ld 'c onsequently areo! ita ess~noe.

In the gecond way

~nt, 1 tie's ar~

unl tl vely contained. in a. eubjeqt;

a;e lfsuhsequent to the subject. beqause t hey are properties of
the eonta.iner, and icyr t h is

oonta.iner 1 te6'lf",

t h ey are not distinct from the

111 thi s way many pass1onsor properties are

conta.ined wi thin DelnSf and
fh€H~e

~eaSQn

a,r,$

notb1.ng ,o ther than being 1 t.self '.'

tranae,e ndental p:rope.r tles, ho't'H&Ver, suoh as unity" truth an

goodness are quid,di t 'a tl Taly and formally distinct from a-n eh othet'
and.

t~pm

being 1t$elf"

m~taph181es

parallel.

:By safeSUardlng thes$ pr()pert1es as real,

i8 safe(5Uarded as a,;r>:e a,l ,s cience,

sino~

Th~re

is a. perfect

in thet g-aTn<1J ..",ay that being eOl'l.talns un1.tlvely the

formal ,r&tlo' ,o f unity. tt'tithand gOOanesB, t h e soulcont,aU1s un.l-

tlvely the f 'oI'lilal :t:"at1p ot' aens:l.t,1vity a.nd .! ntel1ectv:altty, thO,t tg
t h ey-a.re formally distinct., 77
Duns

have a l;"eal

SC'QtU$

makes use of the Pl."01?oslt1onthat. 1fth1ngs

dlstln~1aon whenth~y ar~

really MpaX'B.ted,

they~...

ta.1:n t hat c1.i stin¢t,1cm conceptually or fO\t'mally when t hey are not
r$'al1y distinct .. 78
tW~E)n things ' 1vhe~1.

If theI'et lsac;ti);rtaln order ot', l"'~latlon be-

they are real1y d1.stinot" they '3'111 retain thi$ '

order or relatio.n tr!hen they n.-re in a unitive content, ·C·o nsequen-

-,", '"'------~T.' I.'I. , 4'

A,I;. .

t

· 3.

77 ScotuStOPu$p:&,ont'en~Hh II. 4 . . 16, q. unlQs"
Gra.je1t sk 1 , ,The. Fptma';:t.~stJne.~lg!l, 169 ., 110 f.

78,d:b1d." n~ 18 , XIII f 43.

Ip;t4 it *

172 ..

.

n. 17.,
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tly, the intellect is not an essential part o·f t hesQul, but is
only un! tl valy contained. in the· soul as a. property t ,b rbugh Which
the soul acts"

1'h18 property or power, the 1ntellee't , is not for-

mally the s.o ullg essence, but it is formally d istinct, although it
retains its real ldentity and unltyf.'

tha.t the soul has

of 1 t"s

su~h

~xist~nce.

a

na.tur~

We must imagine

'th~refore

in the first instant, as it "rere "

In t hese eoncl instant of 1. ts 9xlstencre. sa to

speak, the soul 1s operative or capable of Qperatlonaco.ol"dlng to.

t his or' that power.

The faoult,i .esor' powers vlhleh are the s ouroes

of' those ,o perations areQGntained un1 '\:,1 v61y itl t he c s·sen¢e of t h e

soul,19
These

pOlqerS

as from a subject.

are properties t ha't spring from the soul

They ax-a ldent10al With the essence of the

s()ul f 'a nd are c alled ptU"t,s of thE} soul, in t he s,e nse that nQ ,o ne

pO"1er is identical

\"li th

the entire perfeotion of the e ssence of

the soul asoontalner, but 1s only a partial pe'P fectlon of' the

soul"

If no one p.ower 1s identical \vlth the entire perfection of

the e ssence of t he soul a.s container, t hen the pOvrer does not COn...
tnin the perf'e etlonof the soul i tS¢llr f. nO;r'the perfections of a ll
the other pm1ers , even though the pm-fer and the aoul are t he same

beca.use of the fOl"ma,l distinction..

Since t ,h e perfeQtions of' the

container a.t'e no't eonta,lnedmutually 1n t hem selves, because they

88

are formally <11 stinot from t he container f. but are rea.lly idemtica
in respe·c t to

So

third, t he pOl1'era of t he s oul also are not mutu-

ally contained in t hemselves; bec ause t hey a re formally distinct
from t he soul, bei ng really identical in re spect to a t hird
power. BO
Francis Lychetus in .nis commentary on t hi s passage
ca.rrie s t h e doctrine of t he formal distinction between t he intellectua l f a culties. of t he soul to t he point where it includes
t he sensl tive faculty.

a~so

The real 1de.n tlty and formal distinction

between t he sensitive power and t he intellectual f a culty of t he

soul seems contradiotory, since t he sensitive faculty 1s composed
of t h e intellectual soul and t he sen se organ ; a.s for example,
vision or touch.

Si nce t he soul separated from t h e body 1s no

longer a sensitive power, it seems t hat t he sensit1ve power is
really dist ~-hct from thl~' soul .
',e

There 1s no contrad iction .in say ...

i ng t hat t he s ensit1ve f a culty is really identica l 'fil t h t h e soul,

if t he senai ti va pov,ar i s oonsidered as a virtue of t he soul 1t ....
self, needing noopel"ation unless united to t he senseore;an.

The

s eparated soul 1 s i nc apable ,Of se eing , be caus e t he p OvlGX> of the
separated soul necessarily needs a determined organ to' ha.ve this

act Qf seeing . 51

80

~p~d.., lh

81

s eotus. ,

19, XIII, 44.lb!d., 173~

cQmm!naor1!4 1n Sente.n:tlas.

q. un1ca; nn .. 22, 23. XI);I"

5.

~ •., 173.

II. d. 16,

174.
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tI

Are the-senses superfluous , , 11

~

soul is un1 ted to the bod y to aohieve 1 ts
th1s union.

c:t:'1.tlc ma.y a.sk?
Ol>fn

The

perfe'o tlon from

Thi s union 'Y/o1.,l,ld not be useless t, 1f t his perfection

could be a oh ieved in some o't her ""'Jay a.lso.

We a 'chieve health no

le ss by using a.n unguent, t han by using a. medicine.

If both will

give, health, the medicine 18 nt;'t. rendered-futile 'by t he useo!
t h e unguent .Oonsequently. kno"'vledge a equired by t r:e use of the

senses ,., and. by another method in t he s'e parated. soul. does not ren-

der usele s s the union ' Of body andsou.l, making it convenient to
.a ,)qulre knO\'lledge by means of

point. is t he

f~\at

th~

sensible 1mage.

!-1ore to t he

tha t t h e! union pisOH1 and body ,i nt ends the per-

f e ction of the wholeconslsttng ot: t hoe,a parts '.

lnsplte of the

fa.ot that no perfeotion ,c an a corue to t his part or to t hat pa rt.
"'" i thoutsuch a union, ne.vertheless, 't he union would not be \lse ...
less, should the perfection of t h e ,vhole per son . princi pally In-

t ended by nature, b~ achieved by means of intUitive k l"lOwledg:$ .a2
: ,i - '

82 S OOtU8, ,onus Qxqn!em.se . IV, d.. .. L~5, q . 2, .xx, 305,
30(5; l! • • non sequitur trustra. animam unir! eorpot'l. EstQ en1m
quod propt er perfeotionem an:tmae fiere't iata unl o) utscili¢et aa ...
qulreret perfeationemsuam ,e x tali unione, n.o nsequltur qUOd frustra ur:1atur, 81 per al1a.m vlam p~ s seteam acqulrere; ,s lenlm a,11quid ord1natu~ a.d f1nem; non frustrs. tit, 81 8.110 modo posslt
finis a ,c quiri, s lcuts! sani tas posei t aequlrl per lot1onem et
potloneIl1, non frustra fit lotiO, o'tsl per potlonem posslt san1tas
haber!; ita ets1 cognltl0 paselt acquirl per usum sensuum,et per
allum modum ab anima sBpara.ta., nOn frustra fit unlo, ex quo 1psa
donven1ens uno modo acquirend1 c.ognl t10nem
<f

Ali tel', at magi €I ad rem. quod unio anlmeoe ad ,c o;rpus non
est fina1iter propter perfect10nem oorporis, nee sola,J'1l perfeet,.1o"
nem animae, sed propter parfectionem totlus cons lstentls ex let1s
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T~o predicate t h e intellective faculty of t he sensitive

faculty a distinction 1s in order.

Since the soul and. it.s pcn..;ers

are :reall.y identical but formallydl stlnct, a mutual predication
in t he Gonet-ete is admitted, but not in the abstract,

for thisls tha t t he

poV{e~ s

'Of t he soul are unitively contained ir

1 ts essence but not quiddltat.tvely .

Although in the abstract ani ..'

mality belO'ngs to' the quldd itatlv-e notIon
say by ahstract! vepl"'edlc? t1on that

1 .s right to
animal. 1I

The reason

ff

'Of

man , it 1s "irong to

human :1 ty 1 s animal '- ty ~ n

pred.l¢a:t.~ln th~ e.onc:rete,

It

however ; that "man 1s an

We cannot pl"edlcate t he pcn'leX's of t he .s oul of eaoh

'0 ....

t her in t h e abstract, as to say t llat nthe intelleot is the Will, II
or #'the int,el1ect 1s t he sense faculty," but

vJ$

can pl."edicate in

the ccmeret~,t.t lntelle'pt,·lIkYA es!.e vol! tJXUm,H or '-'tho intel1ectJ. ve
1.8 th~ sensi tl va .. tiS,
The formal. distinotion C;')f t he soul and its facultl ·e s is

not t 1e s a.ma as Deseart.es f 1;'ea1 identi t..y heti>leen the soul 8.l1.d its

thought.

Bet"\·reen the soul and. its intellectionaand sensations

Descart es pl a.ces only a logi cal d istinction.

Sqotu s , hot/ever.

1'9.1;'1:,1 bus; ~t 1d~p Ii,e at. nulla pe1;l ;'feotio poss1 t a.ocresoer~ hui~
part! vel. ill1, quae non pos set haber1sine tall unione j . t amen
non fit f rustra unio,. quia perf.eotio toti'U.s , quod principal1ter
lntend1tur a natura, non posset haoori ni 's ! 1110 modo.,

XIII. 46.

denIes the " ldent1 ty ot th$; SQul

~ii th

ro1d~nly ad...

1 ts 'O:P<13ra,tlons.,

m1.ts its ld$ntltl '!lith l.ts powers or fa.¢'ttltl~s., 84
W:~
pt)Vl.X-S

sa,;r that

l"eal

B.t at.&n:t!l;lht,. 1.s brQught Qutby
a.n~

(}O,d..

the tl'ans1tl,e n
eaa~n..$· .

C.lpat$d.

~Qrn

Th'$ 8~ul
b~1ng*,

t he S()ul@d i t.l l
t hna ma.k1na: th$

$seen(n~,

f,.Q pa.nthe.1stn~

,s l!)uls1:mllar to GQ4. leada

tbe soul

ldentlt;ybat,,//e~n

$'()ul a.ntl thro'Ughl't s

th~

ll'le..ke$

~he

fh$ tals1t,y ot\h1a

maklnethe proper dlst1not1nna 'between

GQd!a pure,

~¢t .,

"rhile \hesoul is sUbj'e.H3l to

s.

$ubGl .$\~nt

is a.n (in,s , · i:ilf., ~t aereated. fintt'$;

Ii'LlI'l.d ~%'t-1..

:potency to .a .ct,

Co:n$,~q,u"ntly~,

God 1e _

1t'the soul 8.",1;..:$

,!.eJc8,

~brough

1\.$

essenQ~

't .llt. ~bt.1J thr~ugh a c~.mm'Unlcat$d essence,' tMt is ¢re,p..t~d.t Qo·nt1n.io.,
gent an4:ps.rt1elp(3it:e4"B(itb;w$sn the
a.nd

'f:;h~ $sa,n(}~

e$Sen:e~

,and theo.pera.t.lcrn of' t lhe

and

Qpf1~ati cn

fi3~ul 'f .tb~r'9

·1s.

<l>f(k)d,

~

lnt1111....,

l\:~ abysa.,t't85
fh~.

t 'ormal dl .s tinctton

the lntelle(ltl ve taeult ;r *
lends ltself· t ,Q

tha"~

th~1n:tultlv~

b$,tlrt~en

thes$nal t1 v~tt1€;ulty :~

1.8 to s.a y " 1:.he1rreal i d$nt.l t.V

knol'lledg6 of t he lnd1vldualbelns.

wb,1ohl s bothtf~$;:Ii,~~.nt1ta:t undNa.t~e"':nhe1\/'a6 mad..e· :up of
~nt.1t"a:tl va

ntl ttl;"9 al:1dthQ ind! vidual natttr~.

argum~nt" 1.n

59a~p$,

f avor bi

Intultlv~ kn()wl~dse

the.

'rhus W¢· ,sa,s the. \t~

baaed Q:nthe

glml1~itY'

e>4

Gl"aJewakj.,~. "!p;mMD~fp~~n(:ttt\oin,:

8.S

IWA., '1'77.

ClI:l k '
.VQ

jlt1ngest, .DatAn6f>pl~ gbi , ~c:z.e .e!,~v! ~f:~1. sPlu&!) slli ~a

4:111

171.

l18 •

Q't:'

!ntellec£ual know1edae. t h ough in an eminent deg:roee;, 1:11,t h

S$:ns~

knOvJ"ledse" sta'ms from th$ l;"eal I d.entl t::; Qf' t h e tntelleetlv,e

and sensl tl ve

PQi'lerS

a real <11 stln~tlQn
s1t 1v~

ope!rat1on+.

opera.ttOl'lfl arE);

Qr facult.ies ot t he, $¢ul, adml tting_

beti'le~n

h6\~leVlir~;

the intell'e ct1 va ,o peratiob apdthe sen...

In a wcrd. while the powers are, 1d.entle!\l, the

t'~~11rd1sM.not~,

1!he t'0~al dietinc,t1on r ,1nde betore th~QP~:ra t1Qn ~,f thE

intellect

and t he

' n$ common

8~:Q.si tl ve

na.t~e1nB,~parable

faeul.t,y i:ns$parable from t he intelleot! va

i'he 1d$ntlt.y 01'"

ulty.

~O\tnmon

the ,i nd1vidual being, ' a.~
proc$ss

from t he individuality,

of'~nowl$de$,

na:tut'e a.nd lncllvidu,a;11t1 glvaa

th~o,bJ~et.

91 tthe

r

Int&lle~t _ ~nd,

e.bstraet1on and intuit1on.

1he

ta,a..
Us

i ~$ d:ua)

1d.~nt1t.Y'

o,t

the se.ns1 t,lv~ l'fll1'ar. of t .h e soul wi ththe intel1eet1 ve p,owe':r<;>f th6

soul g1ves us a faculty or

kn(),ltleqg~

ew·o unds tO$a,y that as \ he s9ne1t.:1 va
1(uit1v~ 1t;n~';Led,g~

but I n an

tha.t , t he forma l distinct.iQn
jj

·

t:9i~Ult1

fu~n1sh1.ns tiE:

has th$ power of in..

of lts object " so t ,h$ 1ntellect,1'i1e fa.'Qulty

pO'S$esa.s t .·· S POW$l'",

ldd'iS.
e ·o '9

that lS' u:n1qu:e,

~mln~nt d~gre'e..lt

'b~ar8

a

~fl1)·la.t1~n

1$ 111 thl$wta'3

t .O l~t·'Uttlve knoll'"

A niod$rate o(:molusion d.l"a\'m

1s the ch.tal

from the pr'e:v1ou.a d.1J3:t)uaalQ ·

oha~acterot O~ knQ111~d,8~ ·.

Our

knQ¥tl~dge

Our

tl ve, but to be adequate must a.leo be 1ntul tl V('h
t'~lles

on the$enslble i mage 'o f the phantasm.
pr~s~nt

know a thine;. not

is ahertrac
knt:'wled.ge

The intellect ma.y

1n ,. t-s aotual .e xi e.te:nee' by mea.ns of the,

likeness ,o ttheo,b Je:ct retained. in

thes ~nsible

i mage .

The!.m...

m$l.terlal qu1dd1t1 dX>Awn frol11 the matGr1al ot the

ph,ant~sm.,

universal concept, does not adequatoly ,re;prQsent

th~

ist1.ng

conc)ret,~

ind1vidual fr·om which it l'las t.ak:s:t'h

ea

.~

actually ex'"
(lOhE;lequently;

t he mind dem~:nds ' ano·t h$l" kind of knowledge" distlnct :t~Qm a'b$'et'ra~ '

t1ve knowledge ' in

sRe2~~'

singular mat;er1.a.l

thin5s~

to fulfill t he unity ·01' 1ntelle1!:.t a,nd
~ble

speeif1ck1nd of knol11edae 1sthe
1d.;0nt1t1~d

dlx-eot gr'aap O'f' t h e :t.nd.! \T 1 dual 11.8.tu;re. found.

obJeot1.ve

~QIIUnOn

nature. in t he actuallY existing cQneret:e t .h ins _

It 1s t he iTJ1..medla.t:e k;n:(Htled.ga of ath1ng, present and

present" and in 1tsaetual

pleinents
Us

~'i1th

111\11. the,

~x1stenoet

$.'bst.~aet1,V'e knQwledg~ ,t

lntul tlv¢ knm'f ledge corn....
kl1.ovll.ed g~ a'UpPll<;1S

AbstractivG

t he e ssenoe of material things ;

~;;dst1ns ,~ ,~s

lntu~ tive

kno 'ledge pre-

,.

eentat~the

mind . the s;etua:l ax1e'tencE! and ind1 vid.ual! ty o£. t he

9:3 .

e1ngular ttl~ ~ar!:a.l thing,.
There is no doub1l that, in t.he O'Qmpoa;t tion of the

hum~,

'bOdy th~t'e is an unde'r u.able 11nkb~t"'leGn the ma.t~r1al taQ'Ulty ot'
~o'ti, 9~nsa.tion.,

the SEtl1:se o:re;an a.nd 1ta

and, the lmmateJ.1'1al faQ-.

u-i.ty of the intelleot and'" ts :ppoduot.the

eO;n()elit~

a~y

Wb den,y

'conn&Qt1on 'OO-t1>leen aensat,"on a.!ld :intellection.wQul.d make o-t
thQu.ght aeon~re'ttQn '

ma.tte:r

would

the brain

-0 £
~

a~lla.

'3;'0

equate intellect-ion wit.h sl;Jl1sat1Qn

to stop with sense knowlede;e in following

the pr()Cess or
It

material pe;rtlcles fl:~)\dn8 trom the~'1

o.f

rQrrn1~

the 1d&a.;.Between the fQrma11t1es

a'e,n aitlvtty tt-, the par-t,and

na11t.Y'''.

th~~

union in

r~altt$!I,

1s

,t t

'thu8 _.,

the 'e manatiGnaof
fo f

se:ns~t1on

the 1ntelle'c t.

of the sense- facult1es"

directness of }.ntel"o.'c t1on

aenfult10n

.~

~f

t1a.nlma11tll1; the whole; and ,t1 l:"atl.o.

Tbe

the lnte'lle'c tjon t,he -e thel" hand., have a oond of
Q~~at1Qna,

,o f

t'c>rmal dlstlnct1on. an lnsepare,.'ble and real

a. sense" intoth$ '(')pel"a.tlQna
the

t~ -oo~a~

'oot;\ll(~en

o.verflow* -i n

O~l'atl,f)n$

~;o .ntinu1tY'

Qf

with

1he:reseems tO$Jd.st a

t h$ faeultle-a and

t~

a<::t

or

1ntel.leotl-em1> as in fa.ot there 113 an l.ltUl1edlac-3' 'be.

tl-tet:m the -s ensitive faculty and ~heQbject ex1st~nt1$.)'ly pres~nt

to,

th~

sense ,o rgan.

'f he concept ot cont1nu1 ty bet,\·teenQ'bJe-c t and

1nt$11e0t'....... ~tween aeus,f3,t.iQn and intellection merely pushes 1 t
blM,kto a mOl'e remote leV'elof rtta.tar1a.11 ty".demand.$ a. un1 V~frr,sal

't erm bf ,s 'i gn11'ic.atlQn fo,t',

exp~ess1on.

The term best sui t ,e d

'p ;resa t h1e ¢onO$lit seems t"o 'b $ttlntu1 t,1ve (;}ogni t11)n tf •

tOeX~
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Nature is the tQl"'1llal pr1ncipleo.f ~Q:tlv1try~
thing htunaUf'

ol~gan1~;,

or 1nQrga:1l1e has a

nat~e

Every,

t1"omt1'h1chflow6'

t he capab1.1;tty of p¢rf'Qrmlng Va.riQus aotions pt'<>p$r to that
natuvEh
~al

the.e e are the potent1a.11. ties ot nature., Man bas a tla.tu....

des1re fot'

h61pplne$s~Only

p\1r;f'eot happlnes$ls

'i-lhlch 1'r111 sa.tisfy him Guffielently,..

th~

end

Perfeot ha.ppiness i .e. the

v1alQtl of (rod by the lntellet),t e,nd. unlc:m vd.th ft1m in wil:l.,

vision Qf GGl¢l t '/l,ee to f ·a e,e

lenoe' to

th~ ~tu,re

~s

an 1:ntu1ti,on.

~o

~hl~

avoid doing '1IJ'1<:>-

Qf man, there must bee.. natu~a.l capae1ty with,, ·

1nthe intell'9 ct tQr thee v.1 s1.0 n of God.". The oa:pae.l ty for th1'ti
vision .1 s natural:

~he

glft l.tsel.f e.nd its ageney in the handa of

God 1.a ;a.uperna.turallJi

Certe.1n elt.i}ments of our
of t{'i,Il"a.rene's s.
t.l.tit.

are 'beneath t he level

The rermat!~n of thee~ns1 'Ole expressed apeC:1·e e .1s
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